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INTRO DUCTION

Calabresi and Melamed began a scholarly revolution by showing
that legal entitlements have two readily distinguishable forms of pro
tection: property rules and liability rules.1 These two archetypal forms
protect an entitlement holder's interest in markedly different ways via deterrence or compensation. Property rules protect entitlements
by trying to deter others from taking. Liability rules, on the other hand,
protect entitlements not by deterring but by trying to compensate the
victim of nonconsensual takings.2 Accordingly, the compensatory im
petus behind liability rules focuses on the takee's welfare - making
sure the sanction is sufficient to compensate the takee. The deterrent
impetus behind property rules, however, focuses on the potential
taker's welfare - making sure the sanction is sufficient to deter the
taker. Thus, disgorgement and prison terms exemplify traditional
property rule remedies, while expectation and other compensatory
damages fall squarely within the liability rule camp.
Viewing liability rules as a distinct category of entitlement allowed
Calabresi and Melamed to identify a missing category in the way
courts resolved nuisance disputes. Consider the classic, if somewhat
idealized, nuisance dispute between a single "Polluter" and a single
"Resident" who is discomforted by the pollution. Prior to One View of
the Cathedral, courts traditionally chose from among three categories
of judgment:
Rule 1 : the court issues an injunction against the Polluter;
Rule 2: the court finds the Polluter has created a nuisance
but permits pollution to continue provided the
Polluter pays damages; or

1. Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
2. Property rules also often protect entitlements from intentional takings, while liability
rules protect them from negligent takings. Hence, you commit a criminal offense if you in
tentionally break your neighbor's arm (i.e., a property rule protects the integrity of her arm
with regard to your intentional taking), but you owe your neighbor compensatory damages if
you break her arm through mere negligence (i.e., a liability rule protects the integrity of her
arm with regard to your negligent taking).
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the court finds the Polluter has not created a nui
sance and permits pollution to continue without
restriction.
Appreciating the difference between liability and property rules,
Calabresi and Melamed saw that the three approaches above naturally
fit into a two-by-two box. In this stylized box (shown in Figure 1), the
court determines (i) whether the Resident or the Polluter should have
the initial entitlement to control whether pollution will occur,3 and (ii)
whether to protect this entitlement with a property or a liability rule.4
Rule 3:

FIGURE 1: CALABRESI AND MELAMED'S Two-BY-Two Box
WITH THE MISSING CATEGORY

.....

c
Q)

s

Q)
.<;:::
.....
c
�

Rule 1

Rule 2

Rule 3

[Rule 4]

This traditional tripartite approach to nuisance disputes, however,
leaves one of the boxes empty. Calabresi and Melamed's theory thus
suggests a fourth approach:

3. Like Calabresi and Melamed, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1091-93, we
use the term "initial" entitlement to convey the idea that, because of the possibility of a sub
sequent taking, the ultimate entitlement to control whether or not pollution will take place
may belong to a taker.
4. Rule 1, for example, represents a decision in which the court grants the initial enti
tlement to the Resident and protects it with a property rule. This deters the Polluter, with
the threat of contempt of court, from taking the entitlement nonconsensually. In contrast,
Rule 2 awards the initial entitlement to the Resident but protects it only with a less stringent,
compensation-based liability rule under which the Polluter still might nonconsensually take
the Resident's entitlement but pay compensatory damages for doing so. Rule 2 was famously
deployed in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970). Finally, Rule 3
finds the pollution not to be a nuisance at all, thereby effectively giving the initial entitle
ment to continue polluting freely to the Polluter under a property rule.

4
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Rule 4:

the court permits pollution to continue unless the
Resident pays the Polluter damages.5
As fate would have it, the fourth box would not stay empty long. In
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., Justice James
D. Cameron of the Arizona Supreme Court - in what has probably
become the most cited "coming to the nuisance" court decision held that the pollution could be enjoined, but only if the developer
representing the Residents would "indemnify [the Polluter] for a rea
sonable amount of the cost of moving or shutting down."6 Calabresi
and Melamed's good fortune in identifying a vacuum that was almost
simultaneously filled helped solidify their article's well-deserved fame.
This narrative is well known to the vast majority of tort (and prop
erty) professors.7 However, the legal academy seems much less aware
of an analogous phenomenon that has been developing over the last
decade. Starting in 1993 with Madeline Morris's article, The Structure
of Entitlements,8 a group of about a half dozen scholars began to con
ceive of "liability rule" protection as a type of "call option."9 Just as

5. In a recent symposium honoring the twenty-fifth anniversary of One View of the Ca
thedral, Symposium, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: A Twenty-Five Year
Retrospective, 106 YA LE L.J. 2083-221 3 (1997), Calabresi pointed out that James Atwood
had discussed the possibility of a Rule 4-like outcome in a student note that he published in
the Stanford Law Review three years before Calabresi and Melamed's analysis. See Guido
Calabresi, Remarks: The Simple Virtues of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2201, 2204 (1997)
(citing James R. Atwood, Note, An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L.
R EV. 293, 315 (1969)).
6. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972) (Cameron,
V.C.J.). The court's unconditional order seems different than the definition of Rule 4 in the
text, which gives the Resident the choice of whether (a) to pay to stop further pollution or
(b) not to pay and to allow the Polluter to continue polluting. To harmonize the case with
the definition, we must speculate about what would have happened if Del Webb (the devel
oper representing the Residents) had petitioned to void the court order enjoining the pollu
tion as well as the order that Del Webb indemnify Spur (the Polluter). If we believe that the
court would have allowed Del Webb to withdraw its initial complaint and thereby void the
consequent court orders, it would have in effect given Del Webb the Rule 4 choice - that is,
the choice to pay to stop the pollution or not to pay and allow the pollution to continue. At a
minimum, future developers will at least realize that suing in this j urisdiction may in effect
be choosing to pay for an injunction.
7. Indeed, probably a dozen other articles aver, in one way or another, to this history.
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. R EV. 681 (1973); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab,
Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 440,
442 (1995).
8. Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. R EV. 822, 854-56
(1993).
9. See, e.g., Jan Ayres, The 1998 Monsanto Lecture: Protecting Property with Puts, 32
VAL. U. L. REV. 793 (1 998); Jan Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as A uctions: Prop
erty Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 729-33 (1996); Ian Ayres & Eric
Talley, Salamonie Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104
YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Richard Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of
Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2093 (1997); Krier & Schwab, supra note 7, at 470-75;
Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106
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the property versus liability rule distinction helped Calabresi and
Melamed discover the missing Rule 4, the call-option reconceptualiza
tion of the two liability rules (Rules 2 and 4) naturally led to the rec
ognition of two additional "put-option" liability rules.
A call is an option to buy. The option holder can force a sale at the
exercise price even if the seller does not want to sell. Rules 2 and 4
have just this type of "call" quality. Under Rule 2, the Polluter has a
call option in the form of the choice to pay damages - the choice, in
effect, to buy the Resident's right to clean air and, thus, the ability to
continue polluting. The Resident possesses the initial entitlement (the
right to stop the pollution), but the Polluter can force the Resident to
sell this right for a judicially determined amount. Rule 4, on the other
hand, reverses the rights of the Polluter and Resident. Under Rule 4,
the Polluter possesses the initial entitlement, while the Resident has
the call option, and for a judicially determined amount, the Resident
can therefore force the Polluter to cede this right to pollute.10
Once scholars reconceived traditional liability rules as call options
for potential takers, they inevitably began to wonder whether "put
option" rules might not also serve a role. A put is an option to sell.
While call options give option holders the choice to pay a nonnegotia
ble amount (the exercise price), put options give option holders the
choice to be paid a nonnegotiable amount. Call options when exer
cised give rise to "forced sales," but put options give rise to "forced
purchases."
Accordingly, Rule 2 gives the Polluter the choice to pay, and Rule
4 gives the Resident the choice to pay. Scholars considering the classic
Rule 2 and Rule 4 court decisions
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.11
and Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.12- have
often focused only on the difference as to who pays, but a second di
mension exists as to who chooses to force the payment (i.e., the choice
to be paid). Rules 2 and 4 concern a choice to pay, while the put op
tions concern the choice to be paid.
As applied to nuisance disputes, the use of put options suggests
two additional rules that give the initial entitlement holder a put op
tion in the form of an option to force a nonconsensual purchase by the
other side:
-

YALE L.J. 2149 (1997); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175
(1997) (referring to this feature of liability rules as simply an "option").
10. Property rules (Rules 1 and 3) can also fit easily into a call-option framework: the
only difference between a property rule and a liability rule is the difference in the potential
taker's exercise price. Property rules set the exercise price so high that no option holder
would choose to exercise the option. See Ayres & Talley. supra note 9, at 1048.
11. 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970).
12. 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972).
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Rule 5 :

the court permits pollution t o continue but also
grants the Polluter the option to stop polluting
and to receive damages from the Resident; and
Rule 6: the court permits the Resident to enjoin the pol
lution but also grants the Resident the option to
waive this injunctive right in return for damages
from the Polluter.
These "put-option" rules - like their "call-option" counterparts
- are still "liability rules," designed to compensate the initial entitle
ment holder for any nonconsensual transfers of that entitlement rather
than to deter such transfers altogether. The two differ only in that put
options allow the initial entitlement holder to force nonconsensual
transfers, whereas under the more traditional call-option liability rule
the initially unentitled party can force transfers.
Thus, we can expand Figure 1, as shown in Figure 2, to help flesh
out the underlying structure of the six rules:
FIGURE 2: INCORPORA TING THE POSSIBILITY
OF "PUT-OPTION" RULES

Rule 1

Rule2

Rule6

Rule3

Rule4

Rule5
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The two new "put-option" rules - Rules 5 and 6 - resemble each
other, but under Rule 5, the Polluter has the initial entitlement and
put option, whereas under Rule 6, the Resident has the initial entitle
ment and put option.13 Thus, the three columns of Figure 2 differ only
as to which party has the option to force a nonconsensual transfer of
the initial entitlement: under a property rule, neither side has an op
tion to force a transfer; under a traditional liability rule, the unentitled
party has the option to force the initial entitlement holder to sell; and
under a "put-option" rule, the entitlement holder has the option to
force the unentitled party to purchase.
While courts have not used "put-option" rules to resolve nuisance
disputes, they have granted put-option awards as a standard response
to intentional takings in other areas of tort law.
Contrary to accepted wisdom, the common law frequently employs "put
options" - that is, the right to force a nonconsensual purchase - as a
mechanism for protecting entitlements. For example, if Calabresi steals
Melamed's watch, Melamed has the option of suing to recover the watch
(replevin) or suing to receive the watch's value (trover). Similarly, if
Calabresi remains as a holdover tenant in Melamed's apartment,
Melamed has the option of suing to enjoin Calabresi's continuing tres
pass or (at least in some jurisdictions) suing to force Calabresi to pay rent
for up to an entire additional year. Finally, if Calabresi builds an en
croaching wall on Melamed's land, Melamed has the option of suing to
force Calabresi to remove the wall or suing to force Calabresi to perma
nently buy the land on which he has encroached. In each of these exam
ples, once Calabresi takes Melamed's entitlement, the common law
grants Melamed a put option - the option to choose court-determined
damages (for permanently ceding the entitlement to the defendant) or
injunctive relief (to reacquire the entitlement).14

In the nuisance context, instead of giving an Atlantic Cement the (call
option) choice of deciding whether to pay to pollute [Rule 2], a court
might give a Boomer the {put-option) choice of whether to be paid
(and bear continued pollution) or to refuse payment (and win an in
junction against continued pollution) [Rule 6].
Scholars have already made some important progress in analyzing
and clarifying the four liability rules (2, 4, 5, and 6). We now know, for
example, that under any of four liability rules, courts should set
damages equal to the court's best estimate of the value of the party
not possessing a call or put option.15 Authors have also put forward a
13. Some authors have reversed the labels of Rules 5 and 6. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note
9, at 797 n.9; Levmore, supra note 9, at 2163.
14. Ayres, supra note 9, at 800.
15. See Ayres, supra note 9; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Li
ability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HA RV. L. REV. 713, 719 (1996).
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series of reasons why "put-option" rules might at times dominate
"call-option" rules.16 To date, however, very little of this analysis has
addressed a very basic question: to whom should courts award the ini
tial entitlement? Most authors - if they address this question at all suggest that courts should grant the initial entitlement to the litigant it
believes values it more. The Restatement (Second) of Torts codifies
this standard and directs courts to consider whether "the gravity of the
harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct" in deciding whether
an act constitutes a nuisance. 1 7 Although the idea of simply giving the
entitlement to its higher valuer makes eminent sense in terms of allo
cative efficiency under the property rule regimes (Rules 1 and 3), it
does not make sense when choosing among the four liability rules
(Rules 2, 4, 5, and 6).18 At its core, this Article applies mathematical
reasoning to provide practical advice on choosing among liability
rules.19 In doing so, we both simplify and expand the range of judicial
choice.
We simplify judicial choice by revealing a deeper structure under
lying liability rules. Despite popular belief, maximal allocative effi
ciency has nothing to do with who is given the initial entitlement. For
example, Rule 2 - which confers the initial entitlement on the Resi
dent (subject to the Polluter's call option) - produces the exact ex
post allocations, for every possible combination of Polluter and Resi
dent valuations, as Rule 5 - which confers the initial entitlement on
the Polluter, along with a put option. Courts concerned about alloca
tive efficiency should therefore focus not on who is given the initial
entitlement but rather on delegating the allocative choice to the liti
gant who is the more efficient chooser.
Our analysis also expands judicial choice by showing that an infi
nite number of distributive implementations exists within four funda
mental classes of liability rules. While any rule within a particular class
allocates the entitlement between the litigants identically, this multiplic
ity of implementations within each rule is far from redundant, because
each implementation divides the expected total payoff differently. Thus,
16. See Ayres, supra note 9, at 801-13; Krier & Schwab, supra note 7; Levmore, supra
note 9, at 2168-72.
17. RESTATEM ENT (SECO ND) O FTORT S § 826(a) (1979).
18. See discussion infra Section LB.
1 9. For recent discussions on the separate and important question of whether and under
what conditions liability rules dominate (or are dominated by) property rules, see Ayres &
Talley, supra note 9; Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Non
consensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235 (1995) [hereinafter Consensual
and Nonconsensual Advantages]; Epstein, supra note 9; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15;
and Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to
Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995) [hereinafter A Reply to Ayres and Talley].
In the Conclusion, we return to this issue and show how our analysis also informs our
understanding of when property rules will likely dominate liability rules. See infra notes 159164 and accompanying text.
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a central finding of this Article is to show that judges can decouple al
locative and distributive concerns. In other words, a court's decisions
about how to maximize ex post allocative efficiency need not affect its
decisions about which distribution will best promote equity or ex ante
investment.
From the perspective of the initial entitlement holder, liability
rules seem to have compensation as its central aim. But from an effi
ciency perspective liability rules are a means by which an imperfectly
informed court can delegate the allocative choice to private litigants
who potentially have superior allocative information. For example, a
traditional liability rule (Rule 2) can be seen as the court delegating
the allocative choice to the Polluter. The Polluter chooses whether to
pollute, pay damages to the Resident, and thereby allocate the enti
tlement to itself, or to allocate the entitlement to the Resident and
thus pay nothing. In this Article, we provide a theory of how to dele
gate such allocative choice optimally.
The four liability rules of Figure 2 (Rules 2, 4, 5, and 6) give rise to
just two fundamental allocative classes, corresponding to the identity
of the chooser. For convenience, we call these "single-chooser" rules
because only one of the litigants determines the entitlement's final al
location. Rules 2 and 5 constitute "defendant-choice" rules because
they give the defendant the allocative choice,20 while Rules 4 and 6
constitute "plaintiff-choice" rules, which give the plaintiff the alloca
tive choice. There is a continuum of defendant-choice rules and a con
tinuum of plaintiff-choice rules, but all the defendant-choice rules (in
cluding Rules 2 and 5) allocate the entitlement identically and only
differ in the amount of the side payments that are made between the
parties. Likewise, there is a continuum of plaintiff-choice rules (includ
ing Rules 4 and 6) that identically allocate the entitlement, albeit with
different side payments.
We also identify, however, two further fundamental classes of li
ability rules. We dub these "dual-chooser" rules in contradistinction to
the single-chooser rules because both the plaintiff and the defendant
potentially impact the final allocation of the entitlement.21 One class of
such dual-chooser rules allots the entitlement to the plaintiff unless
20. Under Rule 2 as applied to our Resident and Polluter example, the Polluter has the
(call-option) choice either to pollute and pay damages or to refrain and pay nothing; under
Rule 5 the Polluter has a (put-option) choice either to refrain from polluting and receive
damages or to pollute and receive nothing. Under either rule, the Resident has no power to
affect the ultimate allocation except by bargaining with the Polluter in the shadow of these
defendant-choice rules.
21. Jack Balkin and Ian Ayres have previously analyzed second-order liability rules,
which, like dual-chooser liability rules, give both litigants a voice in the ultimate allocation.
See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9. But unlike second-order (or higher) rules, which require
successively higher exercise prices, the dual-chooser rules at the center of this Article con
cern a single set of exercise prices on which both litigants base their decisions. We compare
and contrast dual-chooser rules and second-order rules more fully in Part III, infra.

10
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both parties agree to shift it for a court-determined price to the defen
dant. In other words, either party has the power to veto allocation of
the entitlement to the defendant. Either the plaintiff or the defendant
can thereby cause the entitlement to be allocated to the plaintiff. We
call this subclass of rules "plaintiff-presumption" allocations. The
other subclass of dual-chooser rules allows either party unilaterally to
cause the entitlement to be allocated to the defendant, and we corre
spondingly label these "defendant-presumption" allocations. As with
single-chooser rules, we will give multiple option interpretations of
these dual-chooser rules and show that there are an infinite number of
rules within each of these classes that produce identical entitlement
allocations, but which affect how the disputants divide the entitle
ment's value.
In one sense, the dual-chooser rules represent a kind of centralized
planning writ small. Under these rules, the government (that is, a
judge) sets a price for the entitlement and then essentially asks both
litigants whether they want to trade at that price. While this charac
terization makes the dual-chooser rules seem esoteric and unworldly,
we argue that in some legal contexts, these rules are already being
used. Moreover, we show conditions under which a dual-chooser rule
systematically produces greater allocative efficiency than either class
of single-chooser rules.22
The stylized panels of Figure 3 graphically depict our four core al
locative equilibria. These panels graph the range of possible plaintiff
valuations on the horizontal axis and the range of potential defendant
valuations on the vertical axis. If judges possess perfect information
about litigants' valuations, they could achieve first-best allocative effi
ciency by granting entitlements to defendants whenever the defen
dants' values surpassed the plaintiffs' values. Accordingly, a fully in
formed judge would apply a decision rule falling along the dashed
diagonal lines in the panels.

22. Madeleine Morris mentions in passing the theoretical possibility of "dual-chooser,"
rules, but she does not identify circumstances when they might be advisable nor does she
suggest the possibility of their existence in current legal practice. See Morris, supra note 8, at
854; see also Ayres, supra note 9, at 823-35 (discussing the possibility of such rules);
RONEN A YRAHAM, MODULAR LIABILITY RULES, (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law
& Econ., Univ. of Mich., Working Paper No. 01-003, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=272816 (addressing extensively the ra
tionales for such rules).
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An imperfectly informed judge, however, can instead resort to li
ability rules to harness the litigants' superior private information re
garding their own values.23 As pictured in panel (a), the class of
plaintiff-choice single-chooser allocations vertically partitions the

23. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15, at 725.
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valuation space. Consequently, plaintiffs who value the entitlement
more than the damage amount will keep the entitlement for them
selves under these rules, while plaintiffs who value the entitlement less
will allocate the entitlement to the defendants.
Panel (b) depicts the analogous horizontal allocative partition that
the defendant-choice single-chooser allocations produce. For this class
of rules, the court vests the defendants with the power to allocate the
entitlement to themselves when their valuations exceed the damage
amount, or to allocate the entitlement to the plaintiffs when their
valuations fall short of judicially chosen damages. While these single
chooser allocations do not achieve the first-best allocative efficiency
possible under perfect information, they can still enhance allocative
efficiency. They give choosers incentives to make the most efficient
allocative choices they can, given their private information. In other
words, choosers have an advantage over courts because they know
their own valuations, even though, like the courts, they know only the
probability distributions of their opponents' valuations.
Panels ( c) and ( d) illustrate the partitions for the dual-chooser
rules. Panel (c) shows the plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser alloca
tion, in which the entitlement remains with the plaintiff unless both
the plaintiff and the defendant opt to transfer it. Such transfers take
place only if the damage amount exceeds the plaintiff's valuation and
the defendant's valuation exceeds the damage amount. If, on the other
hand, the plaintiff's valuation exceeds the damage amount, the plain
tiff will choose to keep the entitlement and forego the damage pay
ment the defendant would otherwise have made. Conversely, when
the damage amount exceeds the defendant's valuation, the defendant
will refuse to accept the entitlement rather than pay the higher dam
age amount. Similarly, panel (d) shows the analogous defendant
presumption dual-chooser allocation, which ultimately allocates the
entitlement to the defendant unless both parties opt for transfer to the
plaintiff.
All four classes of rules allocate the upper left quadrant to the de
fendant and the lower right quadrant to the plaintiff. But there are two
crucial differences. First, the four types of rules may differ as to what
damage amounts produce optimal efficiency. We will show that the
optimal damages for all the rules within a class are the same, but that
optimal damages may differ among the classes. One of our tasks in this
Article will be to derive the optimal damages for each of the four
classes. Second, the rules differ as to how they allocate the "off
diagonal" quadrants (i.e., the lower-left and upper-right quadrants).
The dual-chooser allocations give both of these off-diagonal quadrants
to the same litigant, while the single-chooser allocations split their
ownership, one quadrant to each party. Therefore, to determine which
of the four basic liability classes maximizes allocative efficiency in any
given situation, a court in effect will need to determine which litigant
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will likely make the more efficient allocative choice within each of
these off-diagonal quadrants. Accordingly, a second task of the Article
is to provide guidance for judges determining which of the four classes
in Figure 3 maximizes allocative efficiency, given judges' imperfect in
formation.
The infinite number of distributive implementations within each
class allows courts to decouple allocative and distributive decisions,
because each implementation within a class divides a constant of
expected total payoffs among the litigants differently.24 Courts choos
ing from among this expanded set of liability rules should first choose
the type of class, that maximizes ex post allocative efficiency, and then
choose the implementation within the class that best meets the dis
tributive demands of equity· or best aligns ex ante investment incen
tives.
The core allocative decision involves the optimal number and iden
tity of the choosers. Selection from among these four allocative classes
will turn on judicial beliefs about how much the litigants value the en
titlement at issue. But instead of being based simply on which litigant
has the higher mean value, we show that judges should base this deci
sion more broadly on how they believe these values to be distributed.25
We will show that dual-chooser allocations will at times dominate
single-chooser allocations and at other times be dominated by them.
Dual-chooser allocations produce higher expected ex post efficiency
when neither litigant can make a "nuanced" decision alone. Thus,
when single-chooser rules might tend to allocate entitlements always
to the same litigants (a decision we term "non-nuanced"), dual
chooser rules tend to improve allocative efficiency. Whereas individ
ual litigants, possessing only their own private information, may form
an initial opinion about the other litigants' valuations, dual-chooser
allocations allow the litigants effectively to exchange information and
recognize together instances when they guessed incorrectly. Under
these circumstances, two heads can work better than one.
Single-chooser allocations can work more effectively, however,
when the court has relatively good information about one litigant's
valuation. A court should therefore delegate allocative authority only
to litigants who have an informational advantage over the imperfectly
informed court. Somewhat counter-intuitively, the litigant who, from
the court's perspective, has a less speculative valuation also has less
ability to make an efficient allocative choice. A litigant with a less
24. In this Article, we generally distinguish between "allocation" of the entitlement at
hand and "distribution" of wealth or value.
25. Even after parties have produced evidence of their respective valuations, we imagine
that courts will still have residual doubts about their true valuations. Some of these doubts
may stem from inevitable uncertainties about the future (e.g., will the factory's new machine
work?), while other doubts may simply result from the litigants' strategic incentive to mis
represent their valuations (e.g., "I really value this land because my dog is buried here").
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speculative valuation has a smaller informational advantage vis-a-vis
both the court and the litigant with damages. Consequently, single
chooser allocations can work more effectively than dual-chooser allo
cations because litigants who know little more than the court should
not wield even partial control over the final destination of the entitle
ment. When judges can determine one litigant's valuation with relative
certainty, they should give the allocative choice only to the other liti
gant. We will therefore show that the selection between the two
single-chooser allocations tends to turn not on which litigant's valua
tion has a higher mean, but rather on which litigant's valuation has,
from the judge's perspective, a higher variance.
Before proceeding, however, we want to emphasize four qualifica
tions to our option approach concerning numerosity, autarky, inten
tionality, and value correlation. First, we model disputes between only
two litigants. Many nuisance examples, however, concern a single
source whose pollution adversely affects multiple parties (a la Boomer
or Spur).26 Nevertheless, scores of nuisance cases centrally revolve
around a dispute between only two people.27 Moreover, we can model
even multiple-plaintiff cases in a bilateral fashion if they involve a suf
ficiently uniform plaintiff class. More fundamentally, our models as
sume that only litigants contend for the role of highest entitlement
valuer. Our option approach powerfully analyzes what economists call
"bilateral monopoly,"28 but in many circumstances third parties will
want to enter the notional bidding to possess the entitlement.
Second, our analysis investigates the allocative efficiency of differ
ent liability rules in the absence of bargaining (that is, under condi
tions of "autarky"). This is a restrictive assumption because we should
expect that the litigants will bargain in the shadow of the law in many
instances. Still, our autarky assumption is supported by recent empiri
cism suggesting that real world nuisance disputants almost never bar
gain after courts render j udgment.29 Moreover, as argued by Louis
26. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. , 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970); Spur Indus., Inc.
v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972). James Krier and Stewart Schwab
provided the best modern discussion of how courts should respond to numerosity problems
in choosing among liability rules. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 7.
27. See, e.g. , Copart Indus. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968 (N.Y. 1977)
(pollution from ConEd plant disrupted adjacent new car preparation business); Estancias
Dallas Corp. v. Shultz, 500 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973) (air conditioner noise reduced
value of single adjacent residence). The class of cases dealing with visual nuisances in par
ticular tends to involve a single plaintiff and a single defendant. See, e.g., Fontainebleau
Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 1 14 So.2d 357 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959) (hotel addi·
tion obstructed view of adjacent hotel); Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 198 P.2d
847 (Or. 1948) (light from night-time dog track interfered with adjacent drive-in movie).
28. Rose characteristically hits the nail on the head when she explains that: " Ayres (is)
interested in situations in which two parties are stuck with each other, 'thin' markets instead
of 'thick' ones. Neighboring landowners seem to fit that bill." Rose, supra note 9, at 2183.
29. See Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A
Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (1999).
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Kaplow and Steve Shaven, there are reasons to expect that the relative
efficiency of different liability regimes when bargaining is not possible
will tend to persist when bargaining is possible.30
Third, the option model primarily concerns circumstances of inten
tional taking. While this often (if not usually) describes nuisance dis
putes, courts often (if not usually) apply liability rules in circumstances
of negligent taking. Finally, we assume that the litigants' valuations do
not correlate - meaning that an unusually high entitlement valuation
for the plaintiff does not entail an unusually high entitlement valua
tion for the defendant. This often occurs in nuisance suits where the
economic benefit to the polluter is orthogonal to the noneconomic
detriment to the resident.31
Admittedly, these restrictive assumptions limit the applicability of
our analysis. But as stressed below,32 our assumptions fit the stylized
facts in a rich set of circumstances. While to keep faith with Calabresi
and Melamed we highlight nuisance examples, we believe that con
tractual disputes provide an even larger class where our analysis ob
tains. Liability rules (expectation damages) also traditionally protect
contractual entitlements; the decision to breach (in other words, to
take the promisee's entitlement) is often intentional; and contractual
disputes are often unavoidably bilateral.33 For example, once Epstein
agrees to cut Rose's hair, Rose is the only one with whom Epstein can
bargain if he wants to buy back his promise.34 Although our Article
does not provide a view of the entire legal "cathedral," the problem of
how imperfectly informed courts should resolve bilateral disputes over
intentional takings constitutes much more than a theoretical curiosa.
The Article is divided into four parts. Parts I and II analyze single
and dual-chooser allocations, respectively. These Parts derive the op30. See A Reply to Ayres and Talley, supra note 19, at 228-29. The persistence conjecture
predicts that a liability rule that has a nonconsensual efficiency advantage under conditions
of autarky (i.e., high bargaining costs) will continue under the conditions of low bargaining
costs. According to Kaplow and Shaven, headstarts from nonconsensual efficiency will tend
to persist when bargaining becomes possible. Id. While not denying a persistence effect,
however, we believe that different liability rules themselves can induce different types of
information disclosure and thereby affect the relative efficiency of rules independent of the
autarkic or nonconsensual effect on allocative efficiency. See Consensual and Nonconsensual
Advantages, supra note 19.
31. With regard to visual nuisances, however, correlated valuations occur more fre
quently. For example, new structures often derive much of their value from the good views
they obstruct. See, e.g., Fontainebleau Hotel, 1 14 So. 2d at 357.
32. See infra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
33. Carol Rose has acutely observed that Ayres's previous option analysis has a contrac
tual shadow as its paradigmatic example: "The contractual relationship has only a discrete
number of parties - paradigmatically two - who . . . are stuck with each other. " Rose, su
pra note 9, at 2187. Rose is clearly right that contractual renegotiations often involve limited
numbers and a bilateral monopoly.
34. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 745. While contract renegotiations may serve as
a paradigmatic case of bilateral monopoly, however, other examples exist.
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timal damages for the four basic allocations and analyze the conditions
under which a particular allocative equilibrium is most likely to be ef
ficient. Part III then relates the dual-chooser allocations to the higher
order allocations previously analyzed by Ayres and Balkin.35 Finally,
Part IV investigates how the preceding results are affected when we
relax the most restrictive assumptions of the model. The conclusion
shows how our analysis could be applied to improve contract law and
also how our analysis illuminates the issue of when liability rules
should be used instead of property rules.
I.

SINGLE-CHOOSER RULES

The original pair of liability rules analyzed by Calabresi and
Melamed provides examples of the two fundamental single-chooser
rules. Rule 2 represents a defendant-choice rule because the defen
dant (Polluter) chooses who the ultimate entitlement holder will be,
deciding whether or not to pay to pollute. Conversely, Rule 4 repre
sents a plaintiff-choice rule because the plaintiff (Resident) chooses
who the ultimate entitlement holder will be by deciding whether or
not to pay to stop the pollution.
The option recharacterization not only allows us to see the possi
bility of two more rules, but also clarifies that liability rules (including
"put-option" rules) do not differ merely in the way they protect an en
titlement. We can also think of them as different ways of dividing the
parties' claims to the entitlement. As Carol Rose has written,
[Under a property rule regime], the entitlement holder has the whole
meatball, so to speak, and the other party has nothing - one has prop
erty, the other has zip. Under either of the two [call-option] liability
rules, on the other hand, the meatball gets split: The factory has an op
tion to pollute (or once exercised, an easement), while the homeowner
has a property right subject to an option (or easement). For the sake of
simplicity, I will refer to this kind of right as a PRSTO (or PRSTE) for
"property right subject to an option (or easement). "36

Under this view, options merely segment claims to an entitlement in a
different way than, say, a physical or temporal partition.

35. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9.
36. Rose, supra note 9, at 2178-79. See generally Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 1062-65
(discussing dimensions into which courts might divide an entitlement, including put and call
divisions).
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Table 1. Possible "Derivative" Divisions of an Entitlement
Division of Parties' Claims to an Entitlement
Resident's Claim

Polluter's Claim

Rule 1

Entitlement

0

Rule2

Entitlement - Call

Call

Rule 3

0

Entitlement

Rule4

Call

Entitlement - Call

Rule5

- Put

Entitlement + Put

Rule6

Entitlement + Put

- Put

Rule

Table 1 shows how each of the six rules divides the finite claims to
an entitlement. Each of the rules maintains conservation of "matter,"37
in that the sum of the Polluter's and Resident's assets and liabilities
under each rule nets out to "Entitlement." As Rose noted, a property
rule (such as Rule 1 or 3) gives one party everything and the other
person "zip." But other divisions are possible. Rose saw that a
"PRSTO" is the same as owning the entitlement subject to a liability
(depicted by the "- Call") , in that one might face a sale forced against
one's will for a price less than one's actual value.38 In contrast, the
"put-option" rules (Rules 5 and 6) give initial entitlement holders eve
rything that they would have under a property rule plus a put option.
This necessarily implies that the opposing parties have a liability (de
noted by "- Put") - i.e., they might have to purchase against their will
for a price that is more than their true value.

37. Hohfeld long ago recognized that rights are relational. See Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710
(1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Ju
dicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). One's right (or entitlement) simultaneously im
poses an obligation (or liability) on someone else. The sum of put and call options in any row
of Table 1 equals zero, reflecting this Hohfeldian concept.
38. Viewing liability rules as "derivatively" dividing the claims to an entitlement makes
explicit the idea that changing the type of "protection" for an entitlement also actually
changes the content of the entitlement. See Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the
Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1338-39 (1986). Viewing liability rules as merely
asset divisions also calls into question Richard Epstein's claim about the superiority of
"property rules." Because property rules also protect both the PRSTO and the call option
themselves, see Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 707, Epstein's claim must relate not just to
how to protect entitlements but also to how to bundle collections of strongly protected
claims together.
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In terms of allocative efficiency, the four liability rules collapse
into a choice between just two potential allocations. For any given
damage amount and for any given combination of litigant valuations,
Rule 2 will allocate the entitlement to the same litigant as Rule 5, and
Rule 4 will allocate the entitlement to the same litigant as Rule 6. To
see this, consider an entitlement dispute between two litigants - a
plaintiff and a defendant. Let vn denote the plaintiff's valuation, and
let v Ll denote the defendant's. We assume that both litigants know
their own valuations but - like the court - only know the probability
distribution of their adversary's valuation. We will refer to the prob
ability density function of the plaintiff's and defendant's valuations,
respectively, asfn(y) and,[d(v), and the distribution means as µn and µtJ.
Although we will later relax the following assumptions,39 we also begin
by assuming that the litigants' valuations are distributed independ
ently of one another and that the transaction costs (or enmity) are suf
ficiently high to prevent the litigants from consensually resolving their
dispute.
If we let the court-awarded damages equal D, then one can easily
see40 that under Rule 2, the defendant will exercise its call option, pay
D damages, and force the plaintiff to sell the entitlement if and only if:
VLJ>D.
Similarly, under Rule 5, the defendant will exercise its put option
to force the plaintiff to purchase the entitlement at a price of D dam
ages if and only if:
VLJ<D.41
These inequalities indicate that under either of the defendant
choice rules, defendants will allocate the entitlement to themselves
when they value it more than the damage amount and will allocate the
entitlement to plaintiffs when they value it less. Thus, under the de
fendant-choice rules, the defendant decides the ultimate allocation of
the entitlement independently of the plaintiff's value. Moreover, be
cause the defendant-choice rules produce identical allocations for any
given damage amount and combination of litigant valuations, they
perforce must also produce identical total payoffs.42 This means that,

39. See discussion infra Section IV.E.
40. An Appendix available from the authors proves this proposition.
41. If vd D, the defendant will be indifferent as to whether it exercises either its put or
its call options. How the defendant acts on this indifference, however, will not affect the ex
pected total payoffs for each litigant. The inequalities in the text implicitly assume that the
defendant's willingness to pay equals its willingness to accept. But see Ayres, supra note 9
and infra Section IV.E for a discussion of why this assumption might not hold.
=

42. The payoffs of individual litigants merely equal their valuation of the entitlement
should they ultimately receive it, net of any side payments that they make to or receive from
the opposing litigants. Because the sum of the side payments must equal zero, the total pay-
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given any particular values of D , vn, and v,i, the defendant-choice rules
(Rule 2 and 5) produce equal allocative efficiency.
An analogous result obtains for the plaintiff-choice rules - Rules
4 and 6. Plaintiffs will choose to allocate the entitlement to themselves
only when their valuations of the entitlement exceed the damage
amount. Like the defendant-choice rules, the allocative efficiency of
Rules 4 and 6 remains equal because the physical allocation remains
identical for any possible realization of litigants' values.
We can now see that the judicial selection of an initial entitlement
holder does not determine allocative efficiency. Rule 2 is equivalent to
Rule 5, and Rule 4 is equivalent to Rule 6, even though within each of
these pairs the initial entitlement goes to different litigants. Instead,
allocative efficiency turns crucially on which litigant has the power to
decide the ultimate allocation.
Judicial selection of the initial entitlement holder does, however,
seriously affect how the total payoff is distributed between the plain
tiff and the defendant.43 Looking again at Table 1, defendants clearly
fare better under the defendant-choice rule that gives them the enti
tlement plus a put (Rule 5), than under the defendant-choice rule that
gives them only a call (Rule 2).44
The foregoing suggests that judges choosing among the four liabil
ity rules can separate allocative and distributive concerns. Selection of
the chooser determines the allocative equilibrium, while selection of
the initial entitlement holder determines the distributive equilibrium.
To establish a single-chooser regime, judges must (i) select the more
allocatively efficient chooser, (ii) select a damage amount, and (iii) se
lect how to distribute the expected total payoff (for example, by
choosing between Rules 2 and 5). The remainder of this Section cen
ters on these three tasks.
A

Selecting Optimal Damages

While selecting the optimal choosers seems logically prior to se
lecting the optimal damages, as is often the case in game theory, we
can more conveniently solve the model backwards by deriving first the
offs for the plaintiff and defendant simply equal the value ascribed to the entitlement by the
litigant who ultimately owns it.
43. Note the parallel to the Coase Theorem. In a world without transaction costs, the
judicial assignment of entitlements does not affect the allocative equilibrium but does affect
the distribution of payoffs. Likewise, an autarkic model of liability rules, where high transac
tion costs make bargaining prohibitive, can produce a similar result. Ayres and Balkin dem
onstrated that liability rules form a kind of auction mechanism that would mimic the results
of Coasean negotiations. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 727-29.
44. For example, if the plaintiffs and defendants valuations are independently and uni
formly distributed between $0 and $100, and if damages are set equal to $50 (which we later
show is the optimal amount), then Rule 5 will yield an expected defendant payoff of $62.50,
while Rule 2 will yield the defendant only $12.50. See Ayres, supra note 9, at 806.
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optimal damage amount for a particular chooser and then identifying
the more efficient chooser. Derivation of optimal damages is concep
tually straightforward. Simply setting damages equal to the non
chooser's expected value maximizes the allocative efficiency of single
chooser rules.45 This means that the (allocatively) optimal damage
amount for the defendant-choice allocations will equal:
DA = µn,
and the damage amounts for the plaintiff-choice allocations will equal:
Dn = µA .
These results apply quite generally and hold true regardless of the
distribution of litigants' valuations, as long as the litigants' distribu
tions are independent.46 Courts may still have legitimate concerns
about equity and other aspects of efficiency, such as inducing adequate
ex ante incentives to create the entitlement in question. But we will
show that courts have a separate ability to establish almost any desired
distributive equilibrium, and this strongly counsels in favor of damages
that will maximize the size of the pie.
Damages that equal nonchoosers' expected valuations maximize
the allocative efficiency of a single-chooser allocation because they
give the choosers an incentive to allocate entitlements to themselves
only when their valuations surpass the mean valuations of the non
choosers. Similarly, they give choosers an incentive to allocate enti
tlements to nonchoosers only when their own valuations lie below the
mean valuations of the nonchoosers. Damages equivalent to non
choosers' mean valuations thus harness the private information of
choosers (who are reasonably assumed to know more about their own
valuations), and on average induces an efficient ultimate asset alloca
tion.47 For example, if $50 represents the plaintiff's mean valuation,
45. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15 (deriving this result with regard to call-option
Rules 2 and 4).
46. If the distributions do correlate, courts should still set the optimal single-chooser
rule damages at the nonchooser's mean value - but because this mean value now occurs as
a function of the chooser's value, optimal damages will occur at the fixed point at which
damages equal both the nonchooser's value and the chooser's value. See discussion infra Sec
tion IV.F.
47. As discussed in the next section, Section LC, infra, the single-chooser rules give the
nonchoosers a fixed expected payoff whether or not the choosers exercise their options. For
example, under Rule 2, the plaintiffs as nonchoosers receive an expected value equal to their
mean valuations if defendants do not exercise their call options because plaintiffs will retain
the entitlements. On the other hand, plaintiffs will receive their expected valuations in cash
if defendants do exercise their call options and pay damages set equal to plaintiffs' expected
valuations. Fixing the nonchoosers' expected payoffs makes choosers the residual claimants
of gains arising from exercise of their options. The nonchoosers resemble bondholders in
corporate law who are fixed claimants on the assets of the firm, while choosers resemble the
shareholders who hold the residual claims. Because choosers internalize all the marginal ef
fects of their choice, single-chooser rules give them, like the shareholders in corporate law,
incentives to choose the allocation that maximizes allocative efficiency, conditional on their
superior private knowledge.
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damages of $50 under either Rules 2 or 5 will, on average, encourage
the defendant to take the entitlement only when such an allocation is
efficient.48 Even when judges do not know as much as individual liti
gants, single-chooser liability rules allow judges to exploit the private
information of one of the litigants.
B.

Selecting the Chooser

The second judicial task that affects allocative efficiency involves
selection of the chooser. Although the put and call implementations of
a given single-chooser rule produce identical allocations, nothing
guarantees that a plaintiff-chooser rule will produce the same alloca
tion as a defendant-chooser rule for any given damage amount and
combination of litigant valuations. In this Section, we provide some
guidance as to which party is the more efficient chooser - i.e., which
chooser will produce the highest total expected payoff.49
As a first step to identifying the more efficient chooser, courts
must calculate the total, combined plaintiff and defendant expected
payoff for a particular single-chooser allocation (assuming optimal
damages). We can express these payoffs analytically as:
"'

E [Tot a l P ayoff] = µ nc

+

J (qc - µ nJfc(qc )dqc

where the subscripts c and nc refer to the chooser and nonchooser, re
spectively. We derive the foregoing expression in an appendix,50 but
we can also express it in more stylized terms as:
Expected Total Payoff= nonchooser's mean + chooser's call.
(A)
Intuitively, the chooser has the power to allocate the entitlement to
the nonchooser (in which case the total payoff will equal the non
chooser's) or the chooser can exercise its option of allocating the enti
tlement to itself (in which case the total payoff will equal the non
chooser's mean plus the expected amount by which the chooser's
mean exceeds the damage amount (equivalent to the nonchooser's
mean)). This option (which we label "chooser's call") of allocating the
entitlement to itself when the chooser's privately known value exceeds
48. Defendants under Rule 2 will choose to pollute and pay $50 only if their valuations
exceed the plaintiffs' mean valuations; defendants under Rule 5 will forego payments of $50
only if their valuations exceed that amount.
49. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 7 (suggesting that the smaller, less numerous party
makes the more efficient chooser). The concept of "efficient chooser" is an autarkic analog
to the concept of the more "efficient briber," discussed originally by Calabresi & Hischoff.
Guido Calabresi & John T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972).
50. Appendix, supra note 40.
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the nonchooser's mean is the reason that liability rules systematically
produce higher efficiency than property rules, in the absence of bar
gaining.
But it turns out that the expected total payoff can also be ex
pressed as:
(B)
Expected Total Payoff= chooser's mean + chooser's put.
Thus, we can also think of the single-chooser allocation as allowing
the chooser to keep the entitlement (yielding a payoff on average
equal to the chooser's mean) or to put the entitlement to the non
chooser when the chooser's privately known value falls below the
nonchooser's mean.
Finance cognoscenti will recognize the equivalence of these two
payoff expressions (A and B) as an implication of the "put-call parity
formula," which teaches that whenever one can express a value in
terms of an implicit call, one can also express the same value in terms
of an implicit put.51
When applied to both plaintiff- and defendant-choice allocations,
these two expressions of the expected total payoff give rise to four
equivalent comparisons for determining which litigant is the better
chooser. The plaintiff-choice rules - Rules 4 and 6 - will operate
more efficiently than the defendant-choice rules - Rules 2 and 5 - if
and only if the following equivalent conditions hold:
(i) calln(µLI) > putLl(.un);
(ii) putn(µLI) > callLl(.un);
(iii) µn -µLI > putA(µn) - putn(µLI); and
(iv) calln(µLI) - callLl(.un) >µ n - µLI ;
where, for example, "calln(µLI)" represents the expected value of a call
option for a plaintiff when the exercise price of the call (reported in
the parentheses) is equal to the defendant's mean valuation.52 Two
points immediately merit emphasis. First, these four inequalities
merely restate one another so that probability distributions that satisfy
one of the inequalities must automatically satisfy the others. Second,

51. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART c. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
557-59 (5thed. 1996) (defining put-call parity); Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at
1047 (applying put-call parity to liability rules). The put-call parity formula is often stated in
the following form:
FINANCE

Call + Exercise Price = Put + Underlying Asset.

As applied to single-chooser rules, since the exercise price of the options is set equal to
the nonchooser's mean value, the left-hand side of this equation equals the first expression
(equation A) for the expected total payoff. And since the expected value of the underlying
asset to the chooser is its mean, the right-hand side of this equation equals the second ex
pression (equation B) for the expected total payoff.
52. Analogously, "putn(µA)" represents the expected value of a put option for a defen
dant when we set the exercise price of the put equal to the plaintiffs mean valuation.
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the exercise price of the options is always set at the mean valuation of
non-option holder (i.e. the nonchooser). This latter point is just an im
plication of the last section's finding that optimal damages should be
set at the nonchooser's mean value.
The most important implication of these comparisons, which be
comes particularly evident in the first two inequalities, is that the liti
gant who from the court's perspective has the more speculative53
valuation will tend to make the more efficient chooser. Again, this will
not surprise finance cognoscenti. A central result of derivative theory
is that options tend to be more valuable as the value of the underlying
asset becomes more volatile. The litigant that the court perceives to
have the more speculative value is the litigant with the greater infor
mational advantage.
Even though we assume the litigants' values are privately known,
those values can be uncertain from the court's perspective. And the
court in delegating the allocative choice should grant the allocational
option to the litigant with the greater informational advantage. The
litigant whose value is more difficult for the court to estimate is likely
to be the more efficient option holder because this litigant in choosing
whether to exercise her options indicates whether her value is likely to
be larger than the other litigant. Even though it is strange to think of
the option holders with privately certain but socially uncertain values,
from the perspective of a court (or social planner) with imperfect in
formation the social value of the option is more naturally analogous to
the value of financial option - equaling (as shown above) to the like
lihood that the underlying asset (the litigant's value) will exceed the
exercise price (damages).
Indeed, when the court must select between a litigant with a com
monly known valuation and a litigant with a valuation known to fall
only within a particular probability distribution, the litigant with the
known value never constitutes the more efficient chooser. 54 This
makes intuitive sense. Litigants with commonly known valuations
have no additional information to bring to the decision. If courts gave
such litigants the power to allocate the entitlement (and set damages
equal to the more speculative mean valuation of the opposing litigant),
litigants with known valuations would therefore always allocate enti53. We use the word "speculative" in a special sense. Our model assumes that each liti
gant places a non-speculative, certain dollar value on its ownership of the entitlement while
the court and the adversaries must speculate (via a probability distribution) about how much
the entitlement is valued by the litigant. But in many real-world contexts, however, the liti
gants themselves may not know precisely their own valuations. A polluter, for example, may
also have to speculate about how much profit a polluting factory will yield in the future. We
will later relax this assumption that litigants are perfectly informed about their own valua
tion, see infra Section IV.E, but for now it is sufficient to say that our core qualitative results
go through. The more efficient chooser will continue to be the litigant with the larger infor
mational advantage.

54.

See Appendix, supra note 40.
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tlements to themselves when their own valuations exceed their oppo
nents' mean valuations, or would allocate entitlements to their oppo
nents when their known valuations fall below their opponents' mean
valuations. Thus, a court that grants allocative power to the litigant
with the known, nonspeculative valuation also effectively selects the
ultimate entitlement holder. If the other litigant's valuation happens
to differ from the mean of the probability distribution, however, the
entitlement could end up in the wrong hands as a consequence. In con
trast, courts that grant allocative power to litigants with the specula
tive valuations, and set damages equal to the valuations of the non
speculative litigants, will always achieve first-best allocative efficiency.
Because speculative litigants know when their own valuations deviate
from the mean of their probability distributions, they can prevent what
might otherwise become a misallocation of the ultimate entitlement.
In other words, speculative litigants will allocate entitlements to them
selves when they know, privately, that their valuations exceed those of
the nonspeculative litigants, and will also know to allocate entitle
ments to the nonspeculative litigants when their own valuations are
lower.
In inspecting the latter two inequalities, (iii) and (iv), listed above,
one might initially believe that the relative mean valuations of the liti
gants should also bear on the selection of the more efficient chooser.
But this turns out not to be true. First, as an algebraic matter, notice
that in the third inequality, a higher mean plaintiff valuation, relative
to the defendant's mean, seems to increase the likelihood that the
plaintiff will choose more efficiently. Yet, in the fourth inequality, a
higher plaintiff mean seems to decrease the likelihood that the plaintiff
will choose more efficiently. Both cannot prove true, because these
inequalities are mathematically equivalent.55 As it turns out, neither
intuition proves true because the values of the put options and call op
tions also change in ways that offset the direct impact of any change in
the litigants' relative mean valuations. For example, if the plaintiff's
mean rises relative to the defendant's mean (holding constant the
variance of both litigants' valuations), both the plaintiff's call and the
defendant's put will become more valuable. This shift in relative mean
valuations drives both these options further "into the money."56
55. See id.
56. From a court's perspective, a plaintiff whose mean valuation exceeds the defendant's
mean valuation will more likely exercise a call option because more of the plaintiff's prob
ability distribution will exceed the call's exercise price, which equals the defendant's mean.
Similarly, the defendant will more likely exercise a put option because more of the defen
dant's probability distribution will fall below the put's exercise price, which equals the plain
tiffs mean. In other words, the value of call or put options depends in part on the odds that
the litigants will actually exercise them. The odds that litigants will exercise their options in
turn lie in direct proportion to the odds that their own mean valuations fall above or below
their opponents' mean valuations.
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As a general matter, option value arises as a function of both a
"volatility" effect and an "in the money" effect. As a result of the
"volatility" effect, options generally increase in value when an option
holder's valuation increases in volatility. Under the "in the money" ef
fect, options generally increase in value when (a) a call option holder's
valuation exceeds, or (b) a put option holder's valuation falls short of,
the option's exercise price. In working through the four inequalities,
however, one can see that the "in the money" effect on option value
affects both sides of each inequality in the same manner. An increase
in the plaintiff's mean valuation, relative to the defendant's valuation,
increases both sides of inequality (i) and decreases both sides of ine
quality (ii). In inequality (i), for example, the "in the money" effect on
the plaintiff's call exactly matches its effect on the defendant's put.57
Consequently, a shift in relative mean valuations should not - given
constant volatility - push a court toward either favoring or disfavor
ing a particular litigant as the more efficient chooser.
Courts, in selecting the more efficient chooser, should focus on the
second moment of the distribution (the variance), not the first mo
ment (the mean) and select the litigant who, from the court's perspec
tive, has a higher variance of valuation. This finding suggests that the
Restatement (Second) of Torts is misguided in suggesting that courts
should assign the initial entitlement in nuisance disputes to the party
with the higher valuation. The Restatement's allocation principle
makes eminent sense where the court merely chooses between the two
property rules, Rule 1 and 3. The principle fails to maximize allocative
efficiency, however, when the court contemplates a choice between
the call-option versions of the liability rules (Rules 2 and 4). Although
we demonstrated above that selection of the initial entitlement holder
need not affect the ultimate allocation, this holds true only in a world
that employs both put-option and call-option liability rules - so that
the choice of the initial entitlement holder can be decoupled from the
choice of the more efficient chooser. But the world contemplated by
the Restatement does not decouple these two choices. In the Restate
ment's world (where the only liability rules that judges award are the
call-option versions - Rules 2 and 4), a rule that the litigant with the
higher perceived value should be the initial entitlement holder is tan
tamount to a rule that the litigant with the lower perceived value
should be the chooser - via call-option Rule 2 or 4. Our model does
not support the Restatement's position. Rather, we propose that when
there are two litigants, the more efficient chooser will tend to be the

57. These effects come into play in inequalities (iii) and (iv) as well. A rise in the plain
tiff's mean relative to the defendant's mean also increases both sides of inequalities (iii) and
(iv). In inequality (iii), for example, the left-hand side (µn µ.i) increases, but the right-hand
side also increases as the shift in mean causes "put.i(µn)" to increase and "putn(µ.i)" to de
crease.
-
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chooser who from the court's perspective has the greater variance of
potential private valuation.
From a pragmatic perspective, our two single-chooser allocations
work together so that the court can avoid estimating speculative dam
ages. We have suggested that courts should select as chooser the liti
gant with the more speculative value and then set damages equal to
the less speculative mean of the nonchooser.58
In a less reductive model, the court's selection of the more efficient
chooser will turn on more than just the relative volatility of valuations.
For example, the litigants' relative levels of risk aversion might affect
a court's selection. The variance of the choosers' expected payoffs will
tend to be lower than the nonchoosers' because choosers have greater
control over their destiny. 59 Thus, efficiency-minded courts, other
things held equal, might consider higher risk aversion, as well as more
speculative damages, as desirable qualities for a potential chooser.
At other times, the more efficient chooser will be the party that is
less numerous.6() If a single source of pollution harms multiple resi
dents, it may be difficult to implement a plaintiff-choice allocation. We
will return to this issue below when we provide a more extended dis
cussion of how numerosity affects our analysis.61
C.

Selecting the Distribution

The first two judicial tasks - selecting the chooser and selecting
the damages - are sufficient to determine the allocative equilibrium
for any particular realization of litigant valuations. That is to say, these
two j udicial decisions establish who will ultimately posses the entitle
ment. These decisions do not, however, determine the distributive
equilibrium. For example, a court may finally decide on a defendant
choice rule, but it still needs to select between Rules 2 and 5 in decid
ing how to divide the payoff pie between the litigants. In this Section,
we show that a court can divide the expected total payoff as it likes be
tween the two litigants - unfettered by considerations about alloca-

58. We agree with Kaplow and Shavell that the speculative nature of damages should
not exclude them from the court's assessment, see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15, at 72832, but our approach simplifies the judicial task by requiring only an assessment of the less
speculative litigant's average valuation.
59. See Ayres, supra note 9, at 812-13, 821 & n.81. For example, if the litigants' values
are both uniformly distributed between $0 and $100, then a single-chooser rule will give the
chooser a fixed amount 50% of the time and a $50 range of values the other 50% of the time,
but the rule will give the nonchooser a fixed payoff 50% of the time and a $100 dollar range
of values the other 50% of the time. We derive this more formally in the Appendix, supra
note 40.
60. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 7, at 471-72.
61. See discussion infra Section IV.D.

·
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tive efficiency. In other words, the court can decouple questions of dis
tribution from questions of allocation.
Obviously, a chooser given only a call option to buy an entitlement
will receive a lower payoff than a chooser given an entitlement already
plus a put option. Accordingly, the put implementations of the single
chooser allocations yield a relatively larger payoff for choosers and a
relatively smaller payoff for nonchoosers than the call implementa
tions of the single-chooser allocations.
But we can go even further in characterizing the relative payoffs of
each litigant. Interestingly, the single-chooser allocations grant the
nonchooser an expected payoff that is independent of the entitle
ment's ultimate allocation.62 The nonchooser's expected payoff does
not vary with respect to the chooser's actual allocative choice. More
specifically:
1) Put implementations o f the single-chooser allocations
fix the nonchoosers' expected payoffs at zero whether
or not choosers exercise their put options; and
2) Call implementations of the single-chooser allocations,
on the other hand, fix the nonchoosers' expected pay
offs at their mean valuations, µNe, whether or not
choosers exercise their call options.
To see this, first consider the put implementation of the single
chooser allocations (where the chooser has both the entitlement and a
put option). If the chooser does not exercise the put, the nonchooser's
payoff is zero with certainty because the nonchooser neither receives
the entitlement nor make a payment. Instead, the nonchooser remains
at status quo. Alternatively, if the chooser does exercise the put, the
nonchooser's expected payoff is zero on average because the non
choosers must pay µNe for something that they value on average at µNe·

62. In analyzing the distributive consequences of different rules, one must distinguish
between two different informational perspectives. The ex ante perspective assesses the liti
gants' expected payoffs before they acquire information about their own valuation of the
entitlement. The interim perspective assesses the litigants' expected payoffs after they iden
tify their own valuations but before learning the other side's valuation. From the ex ante
perspective, the possibility of facing the other side's put option does not produce a negative
expected payoff. Under Rule 6, a Resident may force a Polluter to purchase the right to pol
lute, but if the court sets the price at the Polluter's expected valuation, the Polluter's ex
pected payoff equals zero. In contrast, from the interim perspective, the possibility of facing
to the other side's put option can produce a negative expected payoff if, for example, under
Rule 6 a Polluter happens to have a lower than average valuation. The ex ante perspective
also matches the perspective of the court in deciding how to divide the expected payoffs be
tween sets of observationally equivalent litigants. This perspective may at times also bear
relevance to the formation of efficient investment incentives, if the parties don't know their
actualized valuation until after the court creates the entitlement. Nevertheless, the interim
perspective will potentially drive both investment and allocation decisions in other contexts.
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Similar reasoning shows that call implementations fix the nonchoos
ers' expected payoff at µNc.63
Thus, call implementations of single-chooser allocations give the
nonchooser an expected payoff that is µNe higher than put implemen
tations yield. And since we know that put and call implementations of
a single-chooser allocation produce identical expected total payoffs,
equal to µNe + ca/le, it must be true that:
1) The chooser's expected payoff in put implementations
equals the total expected payoff, µNe + callc; and
2) The chooser's expected payoff in call implementations
equals the value of a chooser's call, ca/le.
The varying distributions of the put and the call implementations
give policymakers more flexibility in pursuing nonallocative goals; but,
if only two implementations existed, courts would still possess only a
rather crudely hewn distributive instrument. Distributively minded
lawmakers might at times prefer to sacrifice ex post allocative effi
ciency in favor a more preferred distribution by selecting an inefficient
chooser.64
Fortunately, courts can radically expand the class of single-chooser
allocations by "convexifying" the payoffs between the call and the put
implementations. We refer to this as our convexity result. It turns out
that the two single-chooser allocations can be implemented by not just
four rules but by a double continuum of implementations that give
policymakers the power of smoothly distributing the expected joint
surplus between the litigants as they see fit.65
The key here is to distinguish between the damages that choosers
must pay if they allocate entitlements to themselves, which we denote
as De, from the damages that choosers must pay if they allocate enti-

63. If a chooser exercises the call option, the nonchooser receives µNe with certainty. If a
chooser does not exercise the call option, the nonchooser simply retains the entitlement,
which the nonchooser values on average at µNc·
Of course, once nonchoosers come to know their private value of the entitlement, they
will not be indifferent about whether the chooser exercises its option or not. But the court
(and other policy makers) will never be privy to this privately held information, so the best
that a distributively concerned court can do is to adopt the type of implementation that
tends, on average, to produce a preferred distribution.
64. For example, imagine that the plaintiff is the Jess efficient chooser. Then the court,
in making the defendant the chooser, could give the plaintiff an expected payoff of zero
(through a defendant put implementation - Rule 5) or pn (through a defendant call imple
mentation - Rule 4). But if the court felt that the plaintiff deserved an expected payoff
between zero and µn, it might decide to make the plaintiff the chooser via a call implementa
tion - so that the plaintiff's expected payoff would fall in this intermediate level
(0 < ca/In < Jin).
65. Other authors have suggested a proliferation of liability rules on different grounds,
Levmore, supra note 9, at 2171 (showing how liability rules could require different
levels of negligence before taking), but, with our convexity result, we are the first to focus on
distributive flexibility.

see, e.g. ,
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tlements to nonchoosers, which we denote as DNe· As shown in Table
2, a call implementation of a single-chooser allocation sets De equal to
the nonchoosers' mean, µNe, and sets DNe equal to zero. This means
that the choosers must pay to take the entitlement nonconsensually
but pay nothing if they leave the entitlement in the hands of the non
choosers. In contrast, a put implementation sets De equal to zero and
sets DNe equal to µNe, which means that the choosers pay nothing to
retain the entitlement but receive a payment of µNe if they put the enti
tlement into the hands of the nonchoosers.
We normally think of an option as requiring a monetary payment
only if the option holder exercises the option. But when the puts and
calls are described in terms of the amounts paid by the option holder
contingent on either choice, we open a range of new single-chooser
implementations that still induce the choosers to make identical allo
cations. For example, as shown in Table 2, merely averaging the dam
ages in the put and the call implementations creates a new implemen
tation. This new implementation requires the choosers to pay half the
nonchoosers' mean value when taking the entitlement but entitles the
choosers to a payment of half the nonchoosers' mean value if they al
locate the entitlement to the nonchoosers. We refer to this implemen
tation as a "pay-or-be-paid" rule. This third rule induces identical allo
cations as the put and the call implementations. For example, instead
of asking the plaintiff Residents (under Spur-like application of Rule
4) whether they are willing to pay one million dollars to enjoin the de
fendants' pollution, a "pay-or-be-paid" rule might ask the plaintiff to
elect whether she prefers to pay half a million dollars to stop pollution
or receive half a million dollars from deferidant to accept continued
pollution. In either case, the choosers will only allocate the entitle
ment to themselves if their private value is greater than the nonchoos
ers' mean value because self-allocation requires the choosers to incur
a direct cost of half the nonchoosers' mean value and an opportunity
cost of half the nonchoosers' value, for a sum total in this case of a mil
lion dollars.66 Indeed, any implementation with damages such that:
De - DNe = µNe,
where the damages choosers pay for taking the entitlement less the
damages choosers receive for handing over the entitlement equals the
mean of the nonchoosers, will produce an identical allocation.
-

66. Opportunity cost corresponds to "the price that you pay for things that you might
have done." Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock- Ups: Do Target Treasury Sales Foreclose or
Facilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 682, 688 n.19 (1990) (quoting B I LLY
JOEL, Only the Good Die Young, on THE STRANGER (Columbia Records 1977)).
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2. Expanding the Class of Single-Chooser Implementations
Damages

Expected Payoff

Implementation

De

DNC

Chooser

Nonchooser

Call

flNe

0

ca Ile

fl Nc

Put

0

- µNC

callc + flNc

0

flNd2

- µNJ2

ca Ile + (µ NJ2 )

flNcJ2

flNc + callc

ca Ile

0

Calle +flNc

"Pay-or-Be-Paid"
"Pay-or-Pay"
Alpha
(for all 0 ::: a ::: 1 )

a

(µ Ne + callc)

a

( flNc + callc) - flNc

(1 - a) (flNc + callc)

a

( µNe + callc)

One can also create implementations that produce even more lop
sided distributions than either the put or the call implementations
without undermining the choosers' incentive to make the efficient
choice. For example, Table 1 shows that when the damages choosers
pay to take the entitlement, De, equals the nonchoosers' mean valua
tion plus a call price, µNe + calle, and the payment that the choosers re
ceive for handing over the entitlement, DNe, equals the call price, calle,
a court can restrict the choosers to a zero expected payoff. The court
can thus give the entire expected total payoff to the nonchoosers.67 We
call this a "pay-or-pay" rule because the choosers must pay the non
choosers regardless of whether they allocate the entitlement to them
selves or to the nonchoosers; allocating to the nonchoosers merely re
duces the amount that the choosers must pay. For example, rather
than ask Polluters under Rule 2 whether they will pay one million dol
lars for the right to pollute, a pay-or-pay rule might ask them to
choose between paying $1.2 million for the right to pollute or paying
$0.2 million to forego polluting. As with the foregoing pay-or-be-paid
rule, choosers (absent wealth and framing effects)68 will under either
rule allocate the entitlement to themselves only if their private valua
tions exceed the nonchoosers' mean valuations.

67. To verify this result, just consider the nonchooser's expected payoff. If the chooser
keeps the entitlement, the nonchooser receives µNe + ca/le with certainty; and if the chooser
allocates the entitlement to the nonchooser, the nonchooser receives ca/le and retains the
entitlement, which on average it values at µNe·
68. See discussion infra Section IV.E.
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The put and the pay-or-pay implementations are of particular in
terest because they give these alternatives (while maintaining the
single-chooser rule's allocative efficiency) that allow judges to allocate
all of the expected value to either litigant. The put implementation
gives the entire expected payoff to the chooser, while the pay-or-pay
gives the entire expected payoff to the nonchooser.69 In the absence of
bargaining, the property rules, Rules 1 and 3, also allocate entire pay
offs to one litigant or the other,70 but the distributively extreme liabil
ity rules, the put and pay-or-pay implementations, systematically
dominate their property rule counterparts because they produce larger
expected total payoffs.
By creating convex combinations of the two different types of
damages under these two distributively extreme implementations of
the single-chooser allocations, courts gain the ability to adopt any in
termediate division of the expected total payoff. As shown in the row
labeled "alpha" in Table 2, setting
De = a (µNe + ca/le), and
DNc = a (µ Ne + ca/le) µ Ne,
the court effectively distributes a fraction a of the expected total pay
off to the nonchooser and the remaining fraction, 1 a, to the chooser.
Thus, by choosing the number a between zero and one, this "alpha"
implementation gives the court unfettered flexibility in dividing the
pie between the litigants, without undermining the chooser's incen
tives to maximize the pie's size. For example, when a equals 0.9, the
court can distribute ninety percent of the expected total payoff to the
nonchooser and only ten percent to the chooser while still encouraging
the chooser to allocate the entitlement to the litigant with the higher
valuation. This alpha class includes both pay-or-be-paid rules (in
which a takes on low values), and pay-or-pay rules (in which a takes
on sufficiently higher values).
The reader will no doubt have realized that these new-fangled
pay-or-be-paid and pay-or-pay distributive rules are identical to rules
in which the court simply implements a traditional call-option rule but in addition requires a lump-sum payment between the litigants re
gardless of what allocation the chooser made. Under this reconceptu
alization, the court would set two prices - an allocative price (DA),
which would determine the amount the chooser would pay if it allo
cated the entitlement to itself, and a distributive price (DD), which
would determine the amount the chooser would pay (or be paid if DD
was negative) regardless of its allocative choice. While these alterna
tive implementations are mathematically equivalent, we conjecture
-

-

69. Courts can effect even more lopsided distributions by shifting the De and DNc dam
ages amounts up above the pay-or-pay or down below the put amounts.
70. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 1062-65; Rose, supra note 9, at 2178-79.
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that bundling the allocative and distribute prices together into discrete
rules such as the pay-or-be-paid rule will be less jarring to judges than
an explicitly separate distributive lump sum amount.7 1 Indeed, even
readers who recognized this lump sum addition to the traditional call
option liability rule probably did not recognize that the put-option
rules are mathematically nothing more than call-option rules in which
courts set Do equal to - µNc.72 The very novelty of the put-option im
plementations suggests that the foregoing analysis has not always been
obvious to legal scholars. Indeed, one of the payoffs of this Article is
to show that put-option rules are not esoterica but merely implemen
tations of call-option rules with a lump-sum side payment.
In the past, courts may have been tempted to accommodate dis
tributive considerations by simply raising the call-option exercise price
of the traditional liability rule. Courts could accomplish this, for ex
ample, by requiring an Atlantic Cement to pay more than the Resi
dents' expected valuation to acquire a pollution right.73 The foregoing
analysis shows that such an award would needlessly sacrifice allocative
efficiency by inducing Atlantic Cement to take too infrequently on the
altar of equity. In this example, a better way to increase the Residents'
payoff would be to institute a pay-or-pay rule - which would simulta
neously increase the amount that Atlantic Cement would pay even if it
chose not to pollute (DNc) and increase the price it must pay if it chose
to pollute (De). More generally, we have shown that it is misguided for
courts to deviate from setting damages at the nonchooser's mean
valuation as a way to improve distributive equity.
None of these implementations - including the infinity of alpha
implementations - affect the variance of expected payoff for either
the chooser or the nonchooser. Accordingly, the adoption of any one
7 1 . There is a sense, of course, in which the court in setting both De and DNe is setting
two prices. Other law and economic scholars have considered decoupling the amount the
defendant pays from the amount the plaintiff receives. See A. Mitchell Polinsky and
Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J.
ECON. 562 (1991). The type of decoupling this Article proposes, however, differs because
the side payments from the litigants always net to zero.
72. Rule 6, for example, uses a put-option rule that gives the plaintiff both the initial
entitlement and the option to put the entitlement to the defendant at a price equal to defen
dant's mean valuation. But the same allocation and distribution could be implemented by a
Spur -like Rule 4 (which gives the initial entitlement to the defendant but gives the plaintiff a
call option to buy at the defendant's mean valuation) if in addition the court also ordered the
defendant to pay her mean valuation to the plaintiff regardless of the plaintiff's choice (i.e.,
Do = - µNe). Under the call implementation with the lump-sum mean side payment, plaintiffs
would end up with (i) the entitlement and no net dollar transfer if they allocate the entitle
ment to themselves, or (ii) a net dollar transfer equaling the defendant's mean value, if
plaintiffs allocate the entitlement to the defendant. This, of course, yields the same outcome
as under the put implementation.
73. Cf Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970). At some
point, however, an additional increase in the exercise price of the defendant's call would not
increase the plaintiff's expected payoff because the defendant would never agree to pay such
a price.
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of the distributive implementations within a particular single-chooser
allocation would not affect a court's selection of a chooser on the basis
of relative risk aversion. A court's selection of the more efficient
chooser - whether it be motivated by considerations of numerosity,
variance, or risk aversion - is independent of the court's distributive
choice.
This convexity result allows lawmakers to decouple distributive
concerns from ex post allocative efficiency concerns and thus frees
courts to divide the expected total payoff in order to further either eq
uity or to generate better ex ante investment incentives. From an
equity perspective, courts might, for example, fine-tune the extent to
which it rewards a plaintiff's coming-to-a-nuisance claim with an ex
pected payoff. The option perspective also provides courts with an
amount to distribute that exceeds even the mean valuation of the
higher valuing party. Single-chooser allocations produce an expected
total payoff that systematically exceeds the expected valuation of ei
ther party, and a court concerned about matters of equity can now
make a more explicit decision about which litigant has a stronger equi
table claim to this option value.
From an efficiency perspective, a court's division of the expected
total payoff can exert important effects on the parties' ex ante invest
ment incentives. If lawmakers place a high value on the Residents' in
centives to invest in their land, a grant of the entire payoff in the form
of an initial entitlement plus a put option will give them a much
stronger incentive to invest than merely giving them a call.74 Thus, ex
panding the class of plaintiff-chooser and defendant-chooser alloca
tions not only allows lawmakers to better accommodate competing
equity and efficiency concerns, but can also help lawmakers better ac
commodate competing efficiency concerns - that is, the concern with
ex ante investment efficiency and the concern with ex post allocative
efficiency.
While we have shown in our simple model that the courts distribu
tive choice need not affect the chooser's allocative decision making,
there is a sense in which the distributive rules may affect the non
chooser's decision making. In some litigation contexts, the nonchooser
may take an initial action that triggers the chooser's subsequent (put
or call) option. For example, the next section will show that a common
law put rule can be seen as a two-stage process: in the first stage, the
defendant intentionally takes, thereby signaling a willingness to face
the plaintiff's put option in the second stage. Such two-stage liability
regimes exemplify what we call dual-chooser rules because both liti74. See Ayres, supra note 9, at 807; Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 733. The ex ante
investment effects of traditional liability rules are explored by Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Prop
erty Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming Dec. 2001).
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gants have an impact on the ultimate allocation. The goal of the next
section is to analyze what damages maximize the allocative efficiency
of such rules, and to assess the conditions under which dual-chooser
allocations dominate (or are dominated by) single-chooser allocations.
II.

DUAL-CHOOSER RULES

As mentioned in the introduction, there are two or more funda
mental allocations that judges might choose in resolving disputes. We
refer to the legal regimes that give rise to these allocations as "dual
chooser" rules as opposed to single-chooser rules because both liti
gants have a potential impact on how the entitlement is allocated. As
with the single-chooser rules, dual-chooser rules give rise to two dif
ferent allocations. In what we call the "plaintiff-presumption dual
chooser" allocation, either litigant can unilaterally cause the entitle
ment to be allocated to the plaintiff. If either the plaintiff or the de
fendant prefers that the entitlement be allocated to the plaintiff (along
with any court-determined side-payment), then the plaintiff receives
the entitlement. The entitlement is allocated to the defendant only if
both litigants agree to a court-crafted trade. But because either litigant
is sufficient to ensure a plaintiff allocation, the plaintiff-presumption
equilibrium disproportionately favors the entitlement to the plaintiff.
This pro-plaintiff allocation bias appears in panel (c) of Figure 3, in
which three out of four quadrants are allocated to the plaintiff.
Conversely, the defendant-presumption dual-chooser rule allocates
the entitlement to the defendant unless both plaintiff and defendant
choose to allocate the good to the plaintiff (along with the associated
court-determined side-payment). Because either litigant can veto a
plaintiff allocation, this type of rule disproportionately favors alloca
tion of the entitlement to the defendant, as shown in panel (d) of Fig
ure 3.
All four of these basic allocations - the two single-chooser alloca
tions and the two dual-chooser allocations - arise from what we label
"single-price" allocations. In these allocations, the court establishes
both a single allocative price75 and the identity of the chooser or
choosers, and then the court sits back and lets the chooser(s) allocate
the entitlement.
A number of different option interpretations give rise to these
dual-chooser implementations. Here we examine two plaintiff
presumption dual-chooser implementations, but transposing the iden75. In one sense, of course, the court sets two prices in setting both De and DNe· From an
option perspective, however, the court sets only one relevant allocative price, the difference
between these amounts (De - DNe). As discussed above, the court can implement the
decoupling of allocative and distributive concerns alternatively by explicitly setting a single
allocative price, DA, and a single distributive price, Do. See supra notes 71-72 and accompany
ing text.
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tity of the plaintiff and defendants can create analogous defendant
presumption implementations. Consider the following two divisions of
entitlements:
TI: E + put(D11r) - put(D11r)
6. :
(A)
- put(D11r) + put(D17r)
E call(D17r) + put(D17r)
6. :
(B)
II: call(Dnr) - put(Dnr)
In the first, "double-put" regime, (A), the court gives the plaintiff
the initial entitlement plus a put option to receive a price of $Dnp, but
subject to the defendant's put option to sell the entitlement back to
plaintiff, also for $Dnp. This allocations allows either litigant to veto
the transfer of the entitlement to the defendant. The plaintiff can veto
the transfer of the entitlement by refusing to exercise its initial put, but
even if the plaintiff exercises this put, the defendant can veto the
transfer by putting the entitlement back to the plaintiff. We can easily
derive the equilibrium choices, or strategies, that this allocation in
duces. The plaintiff will put the entitlement only if:
V11 < DrJP,
and the defendant will put the entitlement back only if:
VA < D11P,
where v denotes the precise, privately known valuation of each liti
gant, as opposed to their respective mean speculative valuations, µ . As
illustrated in panel (c) of Figure 3, these two conditions together mean
that in equilibrium, the defendant will receive the entitlement if and
only if:
v11 < Dnp < VLJ.76
Alternatively, under the second regime, (B), the court gives the
plaintiff a call option to buy the defendant's initial entitlement but
subject to the defendant's put option to sell. This allocation allows ei
ther litigant to force a transfer of the entitlement to the plaintiff with a
payment of $D11p from plaintiff to defendant. As with regime (A), the
defendant will retain the entitlement if and only if:
vu < D11p < Vii.
This assures that the allocations of these two rules will be identical
for any possible combination of plaintiff and defendant private valua
tions. As with the single-chooser allocations, however, these different
plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser implementations produce very dif-

76. The court could implement another option scheme to allow either party to veto a
transfer of the entitlement to the defendant by:
n: E - call(Dnr) +

call(Dnr)

t.: + call(Dnr) - call(Dnp).

In the text's double-put rule, the plaintiff can in a sense offer to sell the entitlement for
$DnP by initially putting, and the defendant can accept this offer by choosing not to put the
entitlement back. In contrast, this footnote's double-call rule allows the defendant to offer to
buy the entitlement by exercising its initial call option, and the plaintiff can accept this offer
by choosing not to call the entitlement back.
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ferent distributions. By inspecting the initial entitlement division, it is
apparent that the plaintiff's expected payoff increases if the plaintiff
receives the initial entitlement (and potentially receives subsequent
payment for transfer of the entitlement) than if the plaintiff does not
receive the initial entitlement (and can only gain it by paying a court
determined amount).77
At first blush, these. dual-chooser allocations seem esoteric and
otherworldly, but as we intimated at the end of the last section, several
common law settings already provide at least the potential for joint
chooser allocations. For example, if Laurel intentionally encroaches
on Hardy's land, Hardy traditionally has (in addition to damages for
the prior encroachment) the choice of ejectment (an injunction forcing
Laurel to remove the encroachment) or permanent damages (forcing
Laurel to permanently purchase78 the ,encroa�hing property at a court
determined amount).79 Instead of beginning the analysis with Hardy's
allocative choice (of taking back the land or forcing a sale to Laurel),
it may be more useful - at least with regard to deliberate encroach
ment - to think of the law as implementing a dual-chooser allocation.
From this perspective, the encroacher signals a willingness to buy
property at a court-determined price by intentionally encroaching on
it, and the plaintiff indicates a willingness to sell at this same court
determined price by suing for damages instead of ejectment. More
generally, in property law, a temporary taking or impairment of an
other's right often has the effect of triggering a put option.80 When a
deliberate taking, with the prospect of paying compensatory damages,
results in a plaintiff's choice between compensation and restoration of
the entitlement, these dual choices of the litigants implement a plain-

77. The option interpretation of these dual-chooser rules makes clear that they are con
strained versions of what one of us has previously referred to as "second-order rules." See
Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9. The dual-chooser rules constrain these second-order rules by
setting the exercise price of both options to an identical amount, $D. Part III, infra, of this
Article analyzes and compares the unconstrained analog to this constrained, dual-chooser
version.
78. The court may thereby force an encroacher not only to compensate the landowner
for the temporary, past encroachment, but also to purchase a "permanent" right to encroach
on the land in the future, even if the encroacher would actually prefer to remove the en
croachment instead.
79. See Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A. 646, 647 (Pa. 1895) (granting plaintiff the choice of dam
ages for "permanent trespass" or an injunction to remove the "offending ends of the stones,"
after finding that defendant's brick wall encroached one and three-eighths inches under
neath the plaintiff's property).
80. Accordingly, we can apply a similar two-stage analysis to (i) a tenant's choice to hold
over, followed by a landlord's choice to force an additional term lease, see JESSE
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 431 (3d. ed. 1993); RESTATEMENT ( SECOND)
OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 14.4 cmt. f (1977), or (ii) an intentional taking of
chattel followed by the owner's choice of trover (i.e., compensatory damages) or replevin
(i.e., an injunction ordering the chattel's return), see DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra, at 10506.
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tiff-presumption dual-chooser allocation - in that the entitlement will
be allocated to the defendant only if both the defendant's private
valuation surpasses, and the plaintiff's private valuation falls below,
the expected court-awarded damages.
Indeed, under current law, courts may have difficulty implement
ing true plaintiff-choice, single-chooser rules that do not effectively in
clude an element of defendant choice. Plaintiffs traditionally gain put
options only after a defendant temporarily impairs their initial enti
tlement. Thus, an intentional taking by the defendant effectively con
verts such single-chooser put options into dual-chooser allocations.
Only if the defendant takes unintentionally or if the plaintiff comes to
a pre-existing nuisance might we have a circumstance that produces a
true plaintiff-choice allocation.81 But our motivation for studying dual
chooser allocations does not spring solely from their current common
law existence - rather, we intend to show that dual-chooser rules at
times are more allocatively efficient . than single-chooser rules and
should accordingly be added more consciously to policymakers' tool
kits.
A

Selecting Optimal Damages

Damages that maximize the allocative efficiency of plaintiff
presumption dual-chooser are those allocations such that:
(C)
fn(vn Dnp)E[v6 Dnp I ve. > Dnp] fe.(ve. Dnp)E[DnP - Vn I Dnp > vn]
remembering that vn and v6 represent the plaintiff's and defendant's
respective valuation, fn (vn) and f6(v6) represent the plaintiff's and de
fendant's respective probability distribution of these valuations, and E
represents an expectations operator.82 While this optimization equa
tion (which economists call a "first-order condition") initially seems
forbidding, it has a straightforward intuition. By setting damages, the
court simultaneously determines two allocative margins: the margin on
which the plaintiff will veto allocations of the entitlement to the de=

-

=

=

81. In contrast, it is usually possible to implement single chooser rules in which the de
fendant has the sole allocative choice. For example, the defendant's choice both to com
mence pollution and to exercise its call-option amount to a unitary decision to take the enti
tlement and pay damages. Of course, plaintiffs often make deliberate choices about whether
to produce the entitlement in the first place - so the plaintiff's initial investment decision
may introduce elements of plaintiff choice into what otherwise would be a defendant
chooser rule.
There may, however, also be some limits on the ability of courts to vary how the payoff
is distributed. If polluting potentially exposes the polluter to a pay-or-pay allocation, then a
polluter who will ultimately choose not to allocate the entitlement to itself will prefer not to
pollute in the first place. See Levmore, supra note 9, at 2168-70 (discussing impact of ex
pected damages on litigants' initial incentive to pollute or bring suit).
82. See Appendix, supra note 40. Solving an analogous implicit formula for D yields the
optimal damages for the defendant-presumption dual-chooser allocation:
fnf..vn = Dnp)E[DJp - VJ I DJP > VJ] = f,,(vJ = DJp)E[vn - DJP I Vn > D,,p].
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fendant, and the margin on which the defendant will veto allocations
of the entitlement to the defendant. The court's task is to find the sin
gle damage amount that optimally trades off these two veto margin ef
fects. The damage amount that solves the foregoing equation accom
plishes precisely this task.
A small increase in the size of Dnp, from D' to D", for example, has
the simultaneous effect of (i) decreasing the plaintiff's willingness to
veto allocations to the defendant, and (ii) increasing the defendant's
willingness to veto allocations to the defendant.83 The left-hand side of
the optimization equation describes the marginal impact on allocative
efficiency of decreases in the plaintiff's willingness to veto. It repre
sents the changed likelihood that the plaintiff will veto,fn(_Dnp) , multi
plied by the consequent expected change in allocative efficiency,
E[vLJ - Dnp I VLJ > Dnp]. The right-hand side of the equation analogously
represents the marginal impact on allocative efficiency of increasing
the defendant's willingness to veto defendant allocations. Solving the
equation for Dnp therefore yields the damage amount that equates and
thereby balances the marginal effects on allocative efficiency from the
simultaneous increases in both the plaintiff's willingness to accept and
the defendant's willingness to veto allocation of the entitlement to the
defendant.
In practice, the optimal damage amount will often represent a
weighted average of the plaintiff's and the defendant's mean valua
tions. This makes some intuitive sense when one remembers that set
ting damages equal to the litigants' mean valuations optimizes effi
ciency whenever a single litigant can veto and thereby block the
allocation of an entitlement. It should therefore not be surprising that
the optimal joint veto amount will normally lie somewhere between
the optimal damage amounts of the two single-chooser allocations.
Moreover, while it outstrips the quality of the evidence, as well as ju
dicial temperament and training, to ask judges to solve explicitly the
foregoing equation for an optimal D , the idea that optimal plaintiff
presumption dual-chooser damages will often be close to the average
of the litigants' mean valuations provides some pragmatic guidance in
setting damages. 84
83. With higher damage amounts, the plaintiff becomes less likely to veto a defendant
allocation because the plaintiff becomes more willing to allocate the entitlement to the de
fendant as long as:
V{/ < D flp.

Higher damage amounts increase the defendant's likelihood of vetoing defendant alloca
tions because they makes it less likely that:
Dflp < v�.

84. See Ayres, supra note 9, at 827 (discussing possibility of a "joint-veto" regime with
damages that "will approximately split the difference between the Resident's and the Pol
luter's mean valuations").
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We can, however, conjure up examples where the optimal dual
chooser damages do not lie between the mean valuations of the liti
gants. For example, if the plaintiff's valuation is uniformly distributed
between $25 and $75 and the defendant's is uniformly distributed be
tween $0 and $100, the optimal plaintiff-presumption damages equal
$62.50, an amount higher than the litigants' mean valuation of $50.85
This happens because the plaintiff is a systematically poorer chooser
than the defendant. Because the plaintiff's valuation in this example
varies less than the defendant's valuation, the defendant has a greater
informational advantage, relative to the court, than the plaintiff. This
means that a defendant single-chooser allocation would be more effi
cient than a plaintiff single-chooser allocation in this case. The defen
dant's greater informational advantage also affects how an efficiency
minded court would distribute allocative power between the litigants
in tailoring a dual-chooser rule. When the plaintiff has less private in
formation and thus makes a relatively poor chooser, damage amounts
that exceed both parties' mean valuations lower the odds that the
plaintiff will veto a defendant allocation. Erring on the side of more
frequent defendant vetoes yields greater allocative efficiency than
more frequent plaintiff vetoes because the defendant makes more in
formed, and therefore more efficient, choices than does the plaintiff.
We will return to this example again when we compare the four basic
allocations. As we will see, the same effect that causes dual-chooser
damages to take on extreme, and seemingly counterintuitive, values
also causes single-chooser allocations to be more efficient than dual
chooser allocations.
B.

Selecting the D istribution

Before moving on to compare the relative allocative efficiency of
the different rules, we pause here to comment on payoff distribution
under the dual-chooser allocations. As with the single-chooser alloca
tions, an infinity of dual-chooser implementations permits courts to
vary the distribution of payoffs among the individual litigants while
leaving allocative efficiency unaffected. Just as we had earlier distin
guished between damages paid for self-allocation of an entitlement,
De, and damages paid for allocation to the nonchooser, DNc, under the
plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser rules one can also distinguish be
tween:
85. Applying our earlier equation (C) for optimal dual-chooser damages, see supra note
82 and accompanying text, to the particular uniform distributions in this example implies
that optimal damages will solve the following equation:

IOO

I ro
I
I
I
(
D
D
5 0 o v8 - ) I OO dv8 = I OO h/ - vn ) 5 0 dvn ,

J

which, when solved, yields D

=

$62.50.
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the price the defendant pays the plaintiff if
neither litigant vetoes the allocation of the en
titlement to the defendant; and,
the price the defendant pays the plaintiff if one of
D veto
the litigants vetoes a defendant allocation so that
the entitlement goes to the plaintiff.
If we label as D17p the damage amount that solves the foregoing op
timization equation (C), then a continuum of allocatively identical
plaintiff-presumption rules emerges that take the form:
DNo Veto - Dvero = D17p.
For example, if the allocatively optimal damages equal $50, then a
dual-chooser allocation that required the defendant to pay $25 to the
plaintiff when the entitlement is allocated to the defendant (DNo Veto
$25), and required the plaintiff to pay $25 to the defendant when the
entitlement is allocated to the plaintiff (Dveto = -$25) , would produce
exactly the same allocative choices by the litigants as a simpler rule
that required a payment of $50 by the defendant if the parties jointly
chose to allocate the entitlement to the defendant. In either case, the
plaintiff would choose to allocate the entitlement to the defendant
only if the plaintiff valued it less than $50, and the defendant would
choose to allocate the entitlement to itself only if the defendant valued
it more than $50.
Thus, as before, a lock-step increase or decrease in DNo veto and
Dvero does not affect the litigants' allocative choice and a fortiori the
allocative efficiency. Rather, such changes have the effect of increas
ing or decreasing the plaintiff's average share of the expected total
payoff. Courts can therefore freely distribute the total expected payoff
between the litigants as they see fit. Although computationally more
difficult, a dual chooser analog to the "alpha" implementations of the
single-chooser allocations would also allow courts to allot a fraction a
of the expected joint payoffs to the plaintiff and a fraction (1 - a) to
the defendant.86
=

=

86 . For example, assume that D,,r equals the optimal damages for the plaintiff
presumption dual-chooser allocation. Assume further that under the straightforward
"double-put" regime (discussed supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text, in which
DNo Veto = D,11, and Dveto
0), the expected payoffs for the plaintiff and the defendant equal
EP,1 and EP,,, respectively. One can then show that an implementation that sets
DNo Veto = Drrr' - EPrr and Dveto = - EP,, would distribute the ·entire joint expected payoff to the
defendant; and an implementation that sets DNa Veto = D11r + EPJ and Dvero = EP,, would dis
tribute the entire joint expected payoff to the plaintiff. More generally, an implementation
that sets DNoVeto = D,,r - aEP11 + (/ - a) EP,, and Dveto = - aEPrr + (/ - a)EP,, would distribute a
fraction a of the joint expected payoff to the plaintiff and a fraction (/ - a) to the defendant.
=
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Selecting the Choosers

As an initial task in identifying the more efficient chooser, a court
must determine which of the two dual-chooser allocations is more effi
cient, the plaintiff-presumption allocation or the defendant
presumption allocation. Graphically, this comes down to determining
whether to apportion the quadrants II and III (of Figure 4 below) to
the plaintiff or to the defendant. Both dual-chooser allocations appor
tion the first quadrant to the defendant and the fourth quadrant to the
plaintiff. But the plaintiff-presumption regime apportions both of the
remaining quadrants, II and III, to the plaintiff, while the defendant
presumption regime apportions the off-diagonal quadrants to the de
fendant.87
Figure 4
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It turns out that the plaintiff-presumption allocation tends to be
more efficient than the defendant-presumption equilibrium when:
µn > µLJ. 88
For example, imagine that the defendant's valuation is uniformly
distributed between $0 and $100, and that the plaintiff's valuation is
uniformly distributed between $80 and $180. The optimal damages for
either a plaintiff-presumption or a defendant-presumption allocation
will equal $90, the average of the litigants' mean valuations.89 But, as

87. Besides this "off-diagonal" effect, the two types of dual-chooser rules can produce
different optimal damages, which might affect which equilibrium generates more allocative
efficiency.
88. For example, when the litigants' valuations are uniformly distributed, a higher plain
tiff mean implies that the plaintiff-presumption equilibrium will produce a higher expected
joint payoff than the defendant-presumption equilibrium.
89. Applying our earlier equation (C) for optimal dual-chooser damages, see supra text
accompanying note 82, to the particular uniform distributions in this example implies that
optimal damages will solve the following equation:
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Figure 5 shows, a plaintiff-presumption allocation is much more effi
cient than a defendant-presumption allocation because it apportions
the off-diagonal quadrants (II and III) to the plaintiff. Figure 5 shows
that much more of the probability mass in quadrants II and III lies be
low the first-best forty-five degree line than above it.90 In other words,
the plaintiff's valuation will probably exceed the defendant's valuation
in these quadrants. This simple example provides intuitive support for
the claim that the plaintiff-presumption allocation will tend to domi
nate the defendant-presumption equilibrium when the plaintiff's mean
is higher than the defendant's. The converse also tends to hold true.
Figure 5
1 00

,
,
,
,

II

,
,
,

D1w = 90

,
,

,

,
,

80

,

III

IV

0
80

90

1 00

Entitlement allocated to defendant
Entitlement allocated to plaintiff

which when solved yields D

=

$90.00.

90. The forty-five degree diagonal line represents the first-best allocation, possible only
with perfect information.
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Appreciating the theoretical and practical possibility of rules par
tially rehabilitates the Restatement's focus on the parties' relative
valuations. Although the relative size of the litigants' mean valuations
does not significantly bear on the selection between the two single
chooser allocations, it does bear not only on the selection between
dual-chooser allocations, but also (as we are about to see) on the se
lection between dual- and single-chooser allocations themselves.
D. Selecting Among the Four Foundational Single-Price Allocations
To summarize our results thus far, we have shown that four basic
allocations exist - two single-chooser and two dual-chooser alloca
tions. We have derived the optimal damages for each and shown that
courts can divide the expected total payoff between the litigants as it
wishes without affecting the allocative efficiency of any of the four
allocations. Finally, we have shown that under a single-chooser rule,
courts should appoint as chooser the litigant with the more speculative
valuation. Under a dual-chooser rule, on the other hand, courts should
allow either party to veto allocations to the party with the lower mean.
We can restate these last two results more mathematically as fol
lows:
E[TP]n > E[TP].1, and
( 1 ') when an > CT,j ,
E[TP] nP > E[TP] L1P,
(2 ') when µn > µ.1,
where E[TP] represents the expected total payoff, and the subscripts
11, L1, IlP, and L1P refer to the plaintiff-choice, defendant-choice,
plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser and defendant-presumption dual
chooser allocations, respectively. In the following discussion, we refer
to the first result as the "different variance" effect and to the second
result as the "different mean" effect.
Our final task is to try to identify which of the four allocations is
likely to maximize allocative efficiency. In other words, we need to
assess when the better single-chooser allocation dominates (or is
dominated by) the better dual-chooser allocation. As an initial matter,
there are many circumstances in which the four basic equilibria will be
allocatively equivalent. For example, if the litigants have identical and
symmetric probability distributions of valuation, the four classes of
rules will generate identical damages and identical expected total pay
offs. Under such circumstances, apportionment of quadrants II and III
to either litigant will be equally efficient, and so the four different
permutations of quadrant allocations generated by the four basic allo
cations will be equivalent.
But it turns out for more general probability distributions that the
dual-chooser allocations are sometimes better than, and at other times
inferior to, single-chooser allocations. Two heads can be better than
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one; but sometimes one head - that is, a single allocative chooser can be better than two.
The optimal allocation will turn on the relative size of the
different-mean and different-variance effects discussed above. When
the difference in valuation means is large relative to the difference in
valuation variances, a dual-chooser rule that allows either party to
veto an allocation to the lower valuing litigant will tend to dominate
the other three basic allocations. In contrast, when the difference in
valuation variances is large relative to the difference in valuation
means, a single-chooser rule that allows the higher variance litigant to
allocate the entitlement will tend to dominate the other three basic al
locations.91
Put more intuitively, two choosers will tend to be better than one
when the litigants have relatively different means but relatively similar
variances. A sufficiently wide divergence in the litigants' means un
dermines the efficiency of a single-chooser rule because no single
chooser has sufficient information to make a nuanced allocation. By
"nuanced allocation," we mean nothing more than an equilibrium in
which the chooser makes more refined decisions about who will be al
located the entitlement - at times allocating the entitlement to each
litigant. As the different-mean effect comes to dominate the different
variance effect, however, single choosers will tend to make "less
nuanced" decisions - allocating the entitlement to the same litigant
all the time. Under such conditions, a dual-chooser rule can increase
allocative efficiency, because the litigants' combined allocative power
can identify when a given allocation should occur even when single
choosers would not have chosen it.
For example, consider again a defendant whose value is uniformly
distributed between $0 and $100 and a plaintiff whose value is uni
formly distributed between $80 and $180, as in Figure 5 . Notice that
we have intentionally constructed the example so that the different
mean effect will dominate the different-variance effect. The variances
of the litigants' values match (rln = rl.1 = $833.33), but their means dif
fer (µ n $130 > µ.-J = $50). Our prior analysis indicated that the equal
variances would tend to make the plaintiff-choice rule allocatively
equivalent to the defendant-choice rule. Moreover, the unequal mean
valuations tend to favor the plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser alloca=

91. For example, for uncorrelated, uniform distributions it can be shown that when
there is no mean difference but only a variance difference, the better single-chooser rule
dominates the better dual-chooser rule and hence the better single-chooser rule is globally
optimal (within the class of single-price liability rules). Conversely, when there is no variance
difference, but only a mean difference, it can be shown that the better dual-chooser rule
dominates the better single-chooser rule and hence the better dual-chooser rule is globally
optimal.
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tion over the defendant-presumption dual-chooser allocation.92 But
what still needs to be determined is whether the plaintiff-presumption
dual-chooser allocation dominates either of the equivalent single
chooser allocations.
As suggested above, it does, and here's why. Either of the single
chooser allocations produces a non-nuanced decision - allocating the
entitlement exclusively to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff acts as chooser
and damages equal the defendant's mean of $50, then the plaintiff will
always allocate the entitlement to itself.93 Conversely, if the defendant
acts as chooser and damages equal the plaintiff's mean valuation of
$130, the defendant will never allocate the entitlement to itself.94
When the difference in mean valuations becomes sufficiently large,
neither chooser possesses information sufficient to make a nuanced
allocation.
A dual-chooser allocation, by contrast, improves allocative effi
ciency because the joint choice of the litigants allows the entitlement
to go at times to the defendant when the defendant values the entitle
ment more. The dual-chooser allocation allows the low mean litigant
(here, the defendant) to end up with the entitlement when it has an
unusually high value and when the high mean litigant (the plaintiff)
has an unusually low value. As discussed above,95 the optimal dual
chooser damages for this example equal $90. With a single-chooser al
location, a damage amount of $90 would not produce an efficient out
come on average because such an amount would cause the lone
chooser to allocate the entitlement inefficiently to the defendant too
often. The plaintiff-presumption allocation, however, can efficiently
operate with a damage level of $90 because the entitlement will go to
the defendant only when the defendant's valuation exceeds $90 and
the plaintiff's valuation falls short of $90. Figure 5 depicts this more
nuanced allocation. When both litigants have a say in the ultimate
allocation, the expected total payoff increases.96

92. The example can also be easily converted to show how a defendant-presumption
rule can dominate any of the other three foundational allocations by simply reversing the
identity of the plaintiff and defendant probability distributions - so that the plaintiff's value
would be distributed uniformly between $0 and $100, and the defendant's value between $80
and $180.
93. This happens because the plaintiff's valuation ranges from $80 to $180 and thus will
always exceed the $50 damage payment for allocating the entitlement to the defendant.
94. Likewise, this happens because the defendant's valuation ranges from $0 to $100 and
thus the $130 damage payment for allocation to the plaintiff would always exceed the defen
dant's valuation.
95.
96.

See supra note 89 and accompanying text.

Expected joint profits under a plaintiff-presumption allocation equal $130.10, as
compared to single-chooser joint profits of $130.00. When the single-chooser rules allocate
the entitlement exclusively to one litigant, the dual-chooser rules can never produce a lower
expected total payoff because we can set dual-chooser damages to produce an always non-
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When the litigants' estimated mean valuations differ greatly, the
superiority of the dual-chooser allocations resolves an embarrassing
disconnect between our liability rule analysis above and cases like
Boomer. In Boomer, the court estimated that the Polluter valued the
right to pollute much more than the Residents valued the right to no
pollution. 97 Simple single-chooser rules of either the call or put
varieties (Rules 2, 4, 5 and 6) are allocatively embarrassing because
setting the damages equal to the nonchooser's mean would produce
non-nuanced equilibria that are allocatively indistinguishable from
simply giving the polluter a property-rule interest in the entitlement
(Rule 3). Boomer-like residents confronting an allocative price set
equal to the polluter's high mean value would never allocate the enti
tlement to themselves, and an Atlantic Cement-like polluter confront
ing an allocative price set equal to the residents' low mean value
would never fail to allocate the entitlement to itself. When the liti
gants' means vary greatly, single-chooser rules are allocatively a non
event.98 In contrast, the dual-chooser rules intentionally seek out a
damage amount between the litigants' mean valuations - where the
litigants' probability distributions overlap - so as to produce more ef
ficient, nuanced allocations. Unlike the single-chooser allocations,
dual-chooser allocations do not force the court to set damages only at
the plaintiff's or the defendant's mean valuation.99
Dual-chooser allocations, however, are not always preferable.
When the litigants have relatively divergent variances but similar
nuanced equilibrium. For example, if the plaintiff-presumption damages were set at $130,
then the defendant would always veto allocating the entitlement to itself.
97. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970). Whalen v. Union
Bag & Paper Co. , 101 N.E. 805 (N.Y. 1913), also provides an extreme example of the will
ingness of some courts to issue injunctions where a defendant's loss far exceeds the plaintiff's
benefit. In the Union Bag case (discussed later in Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 872) the court as
sessed the plaintiff's harm at $100 per year, while compliance with the injunction caused the
permanent closing of a mill at an investment loss of more than $1,000,000. 101 N.E. at 805.
The New York Court of Appeals concluded, "[A]lthough the damage to the plaintiff may be
slight as compared with the defendant's expense of abating the condition, that is not a good
reason for refusing an injunction." Id. at 806; see also Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threat
ening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1999).
98. The single-chooser rules can also be distributively embarrassing when there is a
great disparity in the litigants' mean valuations. Such rules can force the policy makers at
times to confront unpalatable divisions. For example, if a court decided that the residents in
Boomer were the more efficient choosers, it would have to choose between a call rule, which
might force residents to pay a large sum to stop the pollution, and a put rule, which might
force the polluter to disgorge all of its expected profits from polluting. Our foregoing con
vexity result, however, resolves the distributive embarrassment under either the single- or
dual-chooser implementations.
99. Of course, if their mean valuations diverge too much (or more specifically, if their
probability distributions do not overlap), then the court cannot achieve, nor would they de
sire, a more nuanced allocation, even under the dual-chooser rules. I n such an extreme case,
the court would know for certain that one litigant's valuation exceeded the other litigant's
valuation and would thus face no informational disadvantage. The court could therefore
simply award the entitlement to the higher valuing litigant.
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mean valuations, greater allocative efficiency would be produced by a
single-chooser allocation - granting the allocative choice to the
chooser with the larger variance. The intuition here is that one head
can be better than two when one of the heads is relatively ignorant.
When the litigants' valuation variances differ greatly, courts should
exclude the low variance litigant from having any influence on the ul
timate allocation. A litigant with a relatively small variance has very
little informational advantage over either the court or the opposing
litigant. When the different-variance effect thus dominates the differ
ent-mean effect, courts should select a single chooser rather than allow
a second litigant with very little private information to muck up the
allocation.
In a recent article on the "anticommons," Michael Heller has per
suasively argued that there is an efficient number of vetoers to the de
ployment of entitlements. 1 00 The traditional commons problem occurs
is when the number of potential vetoers is too small - no one can
veto the deployment of the entitlement. But an analogous anticom
mons problem exists when there are too many vetoers who can block
the deployment of an entitlement. Heller's canonical examples con
cern modern Russia, where entrepreneurs may need the approval of
dozens of organizations before they can use a piece of property to
open a business. 1 01 Our finding that single-chooser allocations can
dominate dual-chooser allocations suggests that the anticommons inef
ficiency can kick in even when the number of vetoers is just two.
Sometimes it is efficient to have only a single vetoer.
For a more concrete example, consider again a defendant whose
value is uniformly distributed between $0 and $100 and a plaintiff
whose value is uniformly distributed between $25 and $75. Notice now
that this example in intentionally constructed so that the different
variance effect will dominate the different-mean effect, for the liti
gants have the same mean valuations {µn = µ1.1 = $50), but their valua
tion variances differ (a21.1 = $833.33 > in = $208.33). As our prior
analysis showed, the equality of means will tend to make the two dual
chooser rules allocatively equivalent. The inequality in variances also
suggests that the defendant-choice allocation will dominate the
plaintiff-choice allocation.102 But what still needs to be shown is why
the defendant-choice (single-chooser) allocation dominates either of
the equivalent dual-chooser allocations.
100. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 1 1 1 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
101.
102.

See id. at 633-42.

The example can also be easily converted to show how a plaintiff-joint-veto rule
can dominate any of the other three foundational allocations by simply reversing the identity
of the plaintiff and defendant probability distributions - so that the plaintiffs value was
distributed uniformly between $0 and $100, and the defendant's value between $80 and $180.
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When litigant variances differ greatly, dual-chooser allocations be
come problematic because they allow the more informationally disad
vantaged chooser - the chooser with the less variant valuation - to
have too much control over the entitlement's ultimate allocation. For
example, as shown in Figure 6's depiction of the plaintiff-presumption
allocation, even when the plaintiff's value is higher than the nominal
damage price, this does not provide very good assurance that the
plaintiff's value is higher than the defendant's (higher variance) valua
tion.
Indeed, as discussed above, the relative inferiority of the plaintiff
as chooser in this example causes the optimal damages for the plain
tiff-presumption rule to exceed the mean valuations of both parties,
such that Dnp = $62.50 > µn = µLJ = $50. Because the plaintiff
presumption rule gives the plaintiff too much power to self-allocate
the entitlement, the optimal damages under this rule are raised to re
duce the plaintiff's incentives to self-allocate. Because the litigants
also differ in their level of private information, it is better to induce
the defendant to inefficiently under-take (that is, to allocate the enti
tlement too often to the plaintiff) in order to restrict the poorly in
formed plaintiff's incentive to over-take (that is, to self-allocate the
entitlement too often). The fact that optimal dual-chooser damages lie
outside the litigants' mean valuations is evidence that one of the liti
gants is a particularly inefficient chooser and therefore provides evi
dence that dual-chooser allocations will tend to be inefficient relative
to single-chooser allocations.
The graphical difference between these allocations concerns which
litigant will ultimately possess the entitlement in quadrant II. The
defendant-choice single-chooser rule allocates this quadrant to the de
fendant, thereby enhancing allocative efficiency. Witness Figure 6,
which shows that more of the probability space in quadrant II con
tains situations in which the defendant's valuation exceeds the plain
tiff's (as seen from the larger mass of this quadrant above the
forty-five-degree first-best efficiency line). The simpler defendant
choice rule divests the plaintiff of allocative power and thus lowers the
optimal damages back down to $50 and increases the expected joint
payoff from $60.54 under the plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser allo
cation to $62.50 under the defendant-choice allocation.1 03

103. An analogous argument also shows why, in this example, a defendant-choice allo
cation dominates the defendant-presumption dual-chooser regime. Under a defendant
presumption rule, the defendant cannot prevent the plaintiff from under-taking and putting
the entitlement to the defendant even when the high expected mean defendant has a seri
ously low actual valuation. This scenario exists in much of the lower-left quadrant. A
defendant-presumption rule lowers the optimal damages below the litigants' mean valua
tions in order to increase the poorly informed plaintiff's incentive to allocate the entitlement
to the defendant unilaterally. Rather than distort damages this way, however, we can even
more efficiently give all the allocative power to the defendant through a single-chooser rule.
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Figure 6
100

25

75

Entitlement allocated to defendant
Entitlement allocated to plaintiff

The foregoing two examples were intentionally constructed to
highlight the impact of the different-mean and different-variance
effects by alternately setting one or the other of these differences to
zero. But, more generally, the litigants' distributions may display a
mixture of both mean and variance differences. In such cases, selec
tion of the most efficient allocation will tum on which of these differ
ence effects dominates. Figure 7 graphically shows for a uniform ex
ample which of the four basic allocations will dominate - holding
variance constant - as we change the relative mean valuations of the
two litigants. For example, in panel (a), imagine that the plaintiff's
valuation is uniformly distributed over a $100 range, while the defen
dant's valuation is uniformly distributed over only a $50 range. Of
course, this assumption implies that the variance of the plaintiff's
value exceeds the variance of the defendant's value. We can then add
the litigant's relative mean valuations to the figure by drawing in a
particular forty-five-degree locus of points in which the litigants'
valuations are equal. Thus, the forty-five-degree line toward the upper
left-hand corner depicts an example in which the plaintiff's mean is
greater than the defendant's, while the forty-five-degree line toward

50
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the lower-right hand comer depicts an example in which the defen
dant's mean is greater than the plaintiff's.
Figure 7
µLl + 50

ltJ + 25

flP
n

iJP
µLl + 25

(a) Example where

un > uA

(b) Example where

uA > un

Panel (a) shows that - holding the variance difference constant as the mean difference varies (from a higher plaintiff mean to a higher
defendant mean), three different fundamental allocations in turn be
come the most efficient. For sufficiently large differences in litigant
means in the plaintiff's favor, the different-mean effect dominates the
different-variance effect, making the plaintiff-presumption dual
chooser allocation the most efficient. 1 04 For intermediate differences in
the litigants' means, the different-variance effect dominates, and so
the plaintiff-choice single-chooser allocation dominates. Finally, for
sufficiently large mean differences in the defendant's favor, the differ
ent-mean effect again dominates the variance effect, this time render
ing the defendant-presumption dual-chooser allocation the most effi
cient. Panel (b) works out the optimal allocations for an example in
which the variance of the defendant's valuation exceeds that of the
plaintiff's. When the different-mean effect dominates, one of the dual
chooser allocations is most efficient; when the difference in the liti
gants' means is not as large, the variance effect dominates, and a
104. If µn - µ. > $25, then given the $50 assumed difference in the litigants' uniform dis
tribution limits, the plaintiff-presumption allocation produces the highest payoffs. If
$25 > µn - µ. > - $25, then the plaintiff-choice single-chooser allocation produces the highest
payoffs. Finally, if µ n - µ. < - $25, then the defendant-presumption allocation produces the
highest payoffs.
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defendant-choice single-chooser allocation is most efficient. Indeed,
for the uncorrelated, uniform distribution, the best single-chooser al
location will at least weakly dominate the best dual-chooser allocation
whenever:
I An - A." d :::: I µu - µ,ij
(where the plaintiff and defendant valuations are uniformly distrib
uted between µ ± A.). 1 05
In sum, we have now provided a complete analysis of the four ba
sic single-price allocations. We have also shown what damages opti
mize allocative efficiency for each type of allocation. We have shown
when each type of the four allocations will tend to be allocatively op
timal. And we have shown how courts are free to independently dis
tribute the expected payoff between the litigants.
III. SECOND (AND HIGHER) ORDER RULES
In a previous article, Ian Ayres and Jack Balkin analyzed a type of
regime under what they called a "second-order" liability rule.106 A
second-order rule constitutes a type of dual-chooser allocation be
cause each litigant makes successive allocative choices. Unlike the
dual-chooser allocations analyzed above, however, the second-order
rules do not rely on a single j udicially determined allocative price. In
stead, second-order rules force one litigant to confront one allocative
exercise price, and force the other litigant to confront a different allo
cative exercise price.
For example, if both the plaintiff and defendant have valuations
uniformly distributed between $0 and $100, one type of optimal
second-order liability rule would induce the defendant to exercise an
option to take when its value is higher than $33.33, but would induce
the plaintiff to take back the entitlement when its entitlement is
greater than $66.66. Ayres and Balkin showed that second-order rules
mimicked the allocations of an auction with minimum bid incre
ments.107 This allocative equilibrium is graphically displayed in Figure
105.
106.
107.

See Avraham, supra note 22; Appendix, supra note 40.
See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9.

See id. at 727-28. Unlike traditional auctions, however, in which the proceeds of the
auction go to a non-bidder, the internal auction produced by second (and higher-) order
rules is one in which the proceeds from the winning bidder are paid to the losing bidder. One
could imagine more explicit (external) auction implementations - in which the state initially
took an entitlement (for some fixed payment to plaintiff) and then auctioned the entitlement
to the highest bidder (with the state retaining auction proceeds). Such an auction would fully
economize on the litigants' private information and could be implemented with much more
transparent bidding strategies. This more explicit auction might prove the most efficient of
all depending on the relative transaction costs. And by varying the initial payments from the
government to each of the litigants, the explicit auction approach is also compatible with the
type of distribution decoupling discussed above.
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8. The plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser allocation is a type of
second-order liability rule, but one in which the first- and second
order exercise prices are constrained to be the same.
Figure 8

$0

$66.66

$ 1 00

Entitlement correctly allocated to defendants
Entitlement incorrectly allocated to defendant
Entitlement correctly allocated to plaintiff
Entitlement incorrectly allocated to plaintiff

Ayres and Balkin also showed that allowing exercise prices to vary
induces strategic taking behavior by the initial decisionmaker. For
example, in the foregoing hypothetical a defendant with a private
valuation of only $33 would still find it advantageous to exercise an
initial call option to take an entitlement for $33.33 (thus, paying more
than its valuation) because doing so might induce the plaintiff to take
back and pay the defendant $66.66. In order to induce optimal taking
strategies, the nominal damage amounts would need to be set at
$44.44 (for the defendant's call option) and $66.66 (for the plaintiff's
take-back call option). Given the odds that the plaintiff's valuation
will exceed $66.66 and that the plaintiff will therefore take the enti
tlement back, the defendant's expected profit from strategically taking
the entitlement for a price of $44.44 is negative when the defendant's
true valuation falls anywhere below $33.33. Because of this incentive
for strategic taking, the exercise prices of second-order rules do not
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induce transparently obvious player strategies.
Like its constrained dual-chooser siblings, second-order rules have
multiple option variations that will induce allocatively equivalent allo
cations. For example, either of the following allocations produces what
we call an "unconstrained-plaintiff-presumption" allocation:
(1)
+ ca ll(L ow) - ca ll(H igh )
�:
II: E call(L ow) + ca ll(High)
(2 )
- put(H igh ) + put(L ow),
II: E + put(H igh) - put(L ow)
�:
where the parenthetical Low's and High's merely indicate the ordinal
size of the two exercise prices.
In the first implementation (1), the plaintiff (a) receives the initial
entitlement, (b) subject to the defendant's call option, but ( c) also has
a call option to take back the entitlement at a higher price. Like the
earlier plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser allocation, this allocation
allows either litigant to veto the transfer of the entitlement to the de
fendant. Defendants can veto the transfer of the entitlement to them
selves by refusing to exercise their initial call option, and even if the
defendants exercise their call options, the plaintiffs can veto the trans
fer by exercising their take-back call option. Alternatively, under the
second implementation (2) , the plaintiff receives (a) the initial enti
tlement and (b) an option to put to the defendant at a high exercise
price, but (c) the defendant receives an option to put the entitlement
back to the plaintiff at a lower exercise price.108 An analogous second
order allocation can be implemented by what we call "unconstrained
defendant-presumption" allocations simply by reversing the foregoing
plaintiff and defendant roles.
While these second-order rules may seem the most bizarre of our
ever expanding universe of "liability" rules, Ayres and Balkin have
shown that the court implicitly implemented a second-order rule in the
venerable common law chestnut, Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation
Co.109 In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court held a ship owner
liable when his ship damaged a dock while he attempted to moor the
ship during a storm. The court simultaneously acknowledged that it
would have ordered the dock owner to pay damages to the ship owner
if the dock owner had subsequently unmoored the defendant's ship,
causing it to suffer damage in the storm. As Ayres and B alkin noted:
-

108. The same allocation might also be induced by:
CT:

-

put(Low) + call(High)

�: E + put(Low) - call(High)

(3)

Under this third implementation (3), the defendant has the initial entitlement and a put
option with a low exercise price, while the plaintiff receives a call option with a high exercise
price. The plaintiff and defendant might have to exercise their respective options simultane
ously. The entitlement would end up with the defendant only if neither litigant vetoed such
an allocation by exercising an option. Although the litigants might simultaneously exercise
these options, we would still expect nontransparent strategies, as each party would hedge on
its decision to exercise and hope that the other litigant would exercise at a more favorable
price.
109. 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
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Vincent [is] a vivid example of how the common law protects an option
to take an entitlement (a liability rule) with another liability rule. The
dock owner holds the initial entitlement to the physical security of the
dock. The shipowner (because of the exigencies of the storm) has a first
stage option to "take" the dock by mooring the ship to it and by paying
damages for any injury that results. The dock owner has a second-stage
option to unmoor the ship, but at a cost: The dock owner gives up a
cause of action against the shipowner for damages and exposes himself to
tort liability for any damages to the ship and its crew.110

Under Vincent, both the ship and dock owners had a say in the ulti
mate allocation of the dock, and while nothing indicated that the court
intended to set allocatively optimal rules, it certainly did not constrain
the potential damages in the first and second stages to the same
amount (in contrast with the aforementioned single-price, dual
chooser allocations).
This Section extends Ayres and Balkin's previous analysis by
showing more generally how courts should tailor second-order
damages, as well as by showing that we can apply our convexity result
to second-order rules and again decouple a court's distributive and al
locative concerns. Finally, we compare these unconstrained dual
chooser allocations to the four single-price allocations. Intuitively, it
should not be surprising that a less constrained rule should operate
more efficiently than more constrained rules, and indeed, we find that,
absent transaction costs, second-order rules dominate.
A. Selecting Optimal Damages
Calculating optimal damages is computationally difficult - even
more so than solving the dual-chooser optimization equation outlined
above. We readily admit that such calculations will outstrip the com
putational capacity and temperament of judges. Still, it is possible to
make some progress on the underlying process that would guide a
judge inclined to make such an allocation (possibly with the aid of a
fairly simple piece of computer software).1 1 1 First, it is useful to break
the task into two parts: (1) identifying the optimal "pivot values" that

110. Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 716. Jon Hanson and Matt Stowe first noticed this
unusual aspect of Vincent. See Jon Hanson & Matt Stowe, Lecture Notes, Torts, Harvard
Law School (Fall 1996) (on file with the Yale Law Journal). Robert Ellickson long ago also
proposed a modification of nuisance rules that would amount to a common law implementa
tion of a second-order rule. See Robert C. Ellickson, A lternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nui
sance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973).
111. The real difficulty facing a judge involves reduction of a litigant's valuation to a
probability density function. Once a judge accomplishes this (and interactive software al
ready exists to help quantiphobes undertake just this task through a series of yes/no ques
tions), a piece of software can complete the fairly trivial next step of numerically calculating
the optimal damages. We guess that more complicated computational problems are sur
mounted every time someone dials a phone number.
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define when a chooser will optimally allocate the entitlement to itself
or allocate it to the other litigant; and (2) identifying the nominal
damages that will induce the litigants to adopt particular pivot values
as their equilibrium strategies. For example, in the hypothetical situa
tion above, we set nominal damages at $44.44 and $66.66 so as to in
duce pivot values of $33.33 and $66.66.
The first task of identifying the optimal pivot value has a surpris
ingly simple intuition, which we call the "dispositive-takings princi
ple." To see how this principle might work, consider again a second
order regime in which the defendant has a first-stage call option to
take and the plaintiff has a second-stage option to take back at a
higher price. While it makes superficial sense for a court to want to in
duce takings when the taker believes that its value is greater than the
expected value of the takee, this approach ignores the fact that, in a
second-order regime, many of the first-stage takings will not be dispo
sitive - that is, they will not allocate the entitlement. Some of the
first-stage takees will have values higher than the expected values of
the taker, and they will protect their interests by taking back. The op
timal pivot values should focus on the allocations of particular choos
ers that are expected to be final, or dispositive. Hence, optimal exer
cise prices for second-order rules should induce the first-stage taker to
take whenever the taker's private valuation exceeds the expected
valuation of takees who will not take back.''2 The dispositive-takings
principle requires that dispositive takings must on average increase
welfare.
While the dispositive takings principle has intuitive appeal, imple
menting it would require a j udge to simultaneously solve a system of
two equations for the two unknown pivot values:
Pivot� = E { vn I v n < Pivot n}
Pivotn = E { v Ll I v Ll > Pivot Ll }
where Pivot Ll and Pivot n represent the pivot values at which defen
dants and plaintiffs choose to exercise their taking and take-back op
tions, respectively. 1 13 The first pivot equation asks what is the plain112. Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 717, proved that the dispositive-taking principal
maximized allocative efficiency when the litigants' valuations were uniformly distributed and
conjectured that the principal would also hold true for more general distributions. In the
Appendix, supra note 40, we prove this to be true.
113. The equations can be restated in terms of the explicit integrals and probability den
sity functions as well:
00

Pivott.
Pivot

=

J vn fn ( v n )dv n

PivolJl

Pivot/.\

n

=
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o
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tiff's expected value given that the plaintiff will not take back. It is this
class of plaintiffs for whom the defendant's taking will be dispositive.
The second pivot equation asks what is the defendant's expected value
given that it initially exercised its option to take. It is this class of de
fendant for whom the plaintiff's taking back will be dispositive.
But even after undertaking the arduous task of calculating the op
timal pivot values, a court would then - because of the first-stage
strategic exercise incentive - still need to solve a second system of
equations to determine what nominal damage amounts will induce the
desired pivot strategies. Because second-stage takings are nonstrate
gic, the second-stage damages are identical to the second-stage pivot
value:
Drr = Pivotrr .
But the first-stage damages (because of the problem of strategic first
stage taking) are more complicated:
D LI = P(v rr < Pivot rr)Pivot LI + P(v rr > Pivot rr)Pivot TT·
Notice that first-stage damages equal a weighted average of the two
optimal pivot values (where the weights concern the probability that
the plaintiff's value falls above or below the plaintiff's take-back pivot
value). For example, if the plaintiff and defendant have identical
probability density functions that take on a quadratic form with zero
probability mass at $0 and $100,114 then it can be shown in applying the
foregoing dispositive takings equations that the players' joint payoffs
are maximized if the defendant takes when its valuation is greater than
$37.80 and the plaintiff takes back when its valuation is greater than
$62.20. And to induce these pivot values, it is necessary for a court to
set first-stage damages for defendant taking equal to $45.62 and
second-stage damages for plaintiff taking back equal to $62.20.115 Thus,
while optimal damages for second-order liability rules are tractable for
any possible combination of valuation distributions, the present-day
judiciary will even less likely implement these rules accurately than
the variants mentioned above.
B.

Selecting the Distribution

Continuing bravely on, we find that if a court could determine the
allocatively optimal damages, it could again vary the litigants' individ
ual expected payoffs without affecting the litigants' allocative choice.
In other words, we can extend our previous convexity result to include
second-order liability rules.

114.
115.

Formally, the density functions would take the form:.f{v)

=

6v(J-v).

An example with the much simpler uniform distribution is derived in Ayres &
Balkin, supra note 9.
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Consider, for instance, the familiar example of two litigants with
uniformly distributed valuations between $0 and $100. As discussed
earlier, one example of a second-order rule with optimal damages
would give the defendant a first-stage taking call option with a $44.44
exercise price and the plaintiff a second-stage take-back call option
with a $66.66 exercise price. These nominal damages would induce the
optimal pivot strategies in that the defendant would take when its
value is greater than $33.33 and the plaintiff will take back when its
value is greater than $66.66.11 6
But the same pivot strategies can be induced by a regime that gives
the defendant the first-stage choice of paying $24.44 to the plaintiff to
take the entitlement (De= $24.44) or receiving $20 from the plaintiff if
it does not take (DNc = -$20), and giving the plaintiff the same second
stage choice of paying $66.66 to take back the entitlement (De =
$66.66; DNe = $0). Under such a rule, the defendant will still perceive a
$44.44 cost to taking in the first stage, and thus will continue to find it
worthwhile to strategically take whenever its value is greater than
$33.33. But again, by changing the first-stage option into a pay-or-be
paid rule, this implementation effectively shifts some of the expected
total payoff from the plaintiff to the defendant. All that matters allo
catively is the equality between the difference between De and DNe
and the nominal damages that would be optimal under a more tradi
tional call or put rule. As emphasized above, calculating this initial
number becomes computationally awkward, but a court can easily
move De and DNe in lockstep to create pay-or-be-paid or pay-or-pay
rules that produce distributively different, but allocatively identical,
equilibria. Even in the implementation of second-order rules, a court
can make its distributive decision independently of its allocative deci
sion. So just as there is an infinite class of rules that implement the two
single-chooser allocations and an infinite number of rules that imple
ment the two dual-chooser allocations, there turns out to be an infinite
class of rules that can implement the two second-order allocations.
C.

Selecting the Chooser

Which of these two second-order equilibria will be allocatively su
perior - the "unconstrained defendant-presumption" allocation or
the "unconstrained plaintiff-presumption" allocation? The answer
116. Notice how this equilibrium comports with the dispositive takings principle. The
defendant takes only when the defendant values the entitlement more than those plaintiffs
who will not take it back. The class of plaintiffs who will not take back has valuations rang
ing from $0 to $66.66, and the defendant will take when valuing the entitlement more than
the mid-point of this range, $33.33. Similarly, the plaintiff will take back only when the plain
tiff values the entitlement more than those defendants who took it in the first stage. The
class of defendants from whom a plaintiff might take back has valuations ranging from
$33.33 to $100, and the plaintiff will take back only when valuing the entitlement more than
the midpoint of this range, $66.66.
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parallels our earlier analysis of the constrained dual-chooser alloca
tions: it depends on the litigants' relative mean valuations. The over
arching principle continues to be that as between the two second
order rules, courts should tend to allow either party to veto allocations
to the party with the lower mean valuation. This means that the un
constrained plaintiff-presumption equilibrium will tend to operate
more efficiently than the unconstrained defendant-presumption equi
librium when
µ n > µ tJ ·
For example, imagine that the defendant's valuation is uniformly
distributed between $0 and $100 and that the plaintiff's valuation is
uniformly distributed between $80 and $180. We can show that the op
timal pivot values for an unconstrained plaintiff-presumption alloca
tion equal $86.66 and $93.33 for the defendant and plaintiff, respec
tively.117 In contrast, the optimal pivot values for an unconstrained
defendant-presumption allocation equal $60 for the plaintiff and $120
for the defendant, respectively.118 Each of these pivot values lies out
side the range of the litigant's valuation distributions, and, as a result,
an unconstrained defendant-presumption allocation with optimal
damages would always allocate the entitlement to the plaintiff. Figure
9 graphically depicts the two allocations induced by the two rules, with
optimal pivot values. 119 As shown in the figure, the unconstrained
plaintiff-presumption rule is more efficient than an unconstrained
defendant-presumption rule (as the relative difference in misallocated
entitlements demonstrates) . The unconstrained plaintiff-presumption
rule on balance does a better job of allocating the entitlement to the
defendant in the unusual circumstance when the defendant has the
higher value, whereas the unconstrained defendant-presumption rule
can do no better than allocating the entitlement solely to the plaintiff.

117. By the dispositive takings principle, the pivot values must simultaneously satisfy the
following two equations:
.

Pivot ,

80

+ Pivot n

= �

2

and

Pivot n =

Pivot , +

100

2

'

which, when solved, yield the values in the text. The nominal damages that would induce
these pivot taking values equal $92.43 for the defendant's takings and $93.33 for the plaintiff
taking back.
118. According to the dispositive-takings principle, the pivot value must simultaneously
satisfy the following two equations:
Pivot A =

1 80

+ Pivot

2

n

, and

Pivot n

Pivot 6
=

--

2

'

which, when solved yield the same values in the text.
1 1 9. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 727 fig.l.
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D. Selecting Among the Six Foundational A llocations
Finally, we can usefully compare the relative efficiency of all six
fundamental allocations. If courts could accurately calculate optimal
damages for second-order allocations, the better second-order alloca
tion would always weakly dominate all other allocations in the sense
of producing at least as high an expected total payoff for the litigants
as any of the other five allocations. This is intuitively obvious because
the second-order rules have fewer constraints than either single
chooser or dual-chooser rules. The court sets not one, but two alloca
tive prices and thus has more freedom to harness the private informa
tion of both litigants. Setting two (or more) allocative prices allows a
court to establish an internal auction - where each taking at a se
quentially higher price (or, as is the case with put options, lower price)
effectively allows the individual litigants to credibly signal more in-
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formation about their private valuations.120 Heuristically, these less
constrained liability rules permit the court to make more nuanced as
signments of allocative authority. Just as the convexity result permits
courts to distribute the expected payoffs as they see fit, the higher
order liability rules permit courts to distribute allocative power as they
see fit - instead of giving one side or the other the sole allocative au
thority (as with single-chooser rules), or giving the two parties sym
metric allocative authority (as with the constrained dual-chooser
rules).
More prosaically, second-order rules can never operate less effi
ciently than the other rules because, with the appropriate choice of
damages, second-order rules themselves can effect the same alloca
tions as either of the single-chooser or dual-chooser allocations.
Courts can shape second-order rules to effectuate single-chooser allo
cations by setting the first-stage exercise price at the nonchooser's
valuation and then setting the second-stage price at a sufficiently pro
hibitive amount so that the second-stage chooser would not exercise it.
In addition, courts can shape second-order rules to effectuate dual
chooser allocations by simply setting the first- and second-stage exer
cise prices equal to one another.1 21
Nevertheless, much as we are attracted to the elegant way in which
second-order rules harness the information of both litigants, even
when one litigant has relatively poor information, we believe there are
many pragmatic drawbacks to implementing second-order rules that
rightly refocus our attention on the single-price dual-chooser alloca
tions. This latter type of dual-chooser allocation often represents the
best pragmatic alternative available to courts for harnessing both liti
gants' private information in allocating an entitlement.122 The con
strained dual-chooser allocations, by definition, require the courts to
calculate only a single allocative price, which, in the normal case, will
approach something close to the average of the litigants' mean valua
tions. The single-price dual-chooser allocations analyzed above also
induce transparent, dominant strategies that both the court and the
litigants can readily understand. If the court sets dual-chooser dam
ages at $Dnp under a plaintiff-presumption allocation, the entitlement
will go to the defendant only if vn < DnP < VLJ. The relative simplicity
and transparency of such allocations suggest that the theoretical
1 20. See id. at 729.
121. Indeed, Ayres and Balkin have shown that in a world with costless takings, succes
sively higher-order rules can achieve successively higher expected total payoffs. See id. at
727-33. Higher-order liability rules create more refined auctions with smaller minimum bid
increments, and as a theoretical matter, these rules in the limit can produce first-best effi
ciency.
122. Ayres and Balkin, id. at 733-36, have shown, for example, that as the transaction
costs of taking or of calculating damages increase, single-price rules will tend to dominate
multiple-allocative-price rules.
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dominance of second-order regimes does not moot our initial efforts
to identify how courts should select from an admittedly constrained
class of single-price allocations.
IV. EXTENDING THE ANALYSIS
In this Section, we relax many of the more stringent assumptions of
the foregoing analysis and assess the extent to which these assump
tions limit the model's applicability or its normative implications.
A

Administrative Costs

The foregoing analysis ignored the costs of administering the
liability rules. These costs will likely drive efficiency-minded law
makers toward simpler rules. As just mentioned, second-order rules
may, for example, entail high transactional or computational costs.123
Indeed, when bargaining becomes impossible, the costs of liability rule
administration may militate toward the use of property rules.124 Prop
erty rules tend to deter nonconsensual takings and thus avoid the costs
of administering a liability rule regime. When transaction costs remain
relatively low, on the other hand, the litigation costs involved in ad
ministering a liability rule can somewhat counterintuitively facilitate
greater allocative efficiency.125 Under a liability regime, litigation costs
give the parties an additional impetus to negotiate and hence can
make liability rules more efficient than property rules.
Carol Rose has also stressed that courts may need to incur nontriv
ial costs in determining which parties should have a potential claim to
ultimate ownership of particular entitlements.126 The costs of deter
mining who owns what entitlements will again militate in favor of
property rules but should not greatly impact which of the liability rules
will work best. The foregoing analysis suggests that optimal tailoring
of a liability regime will tum on an assessment of the litigants' valua
tion distributions. We will return to these issues again when we con
sider the associated problems of "numerosity."

123. Id. at 717.
124. One still faces, however, the administration cost of determining who should be as
signed the property right. Under certain circumstances, the costs of determining the high
valuing litigant may exceed the costs of calculating damages. Richard R. W. Brooks, Choos
ing Property Rules or Liability Rules: The Burden of Determining Optimal Remedies (Aug.
2001) (unpublished working paper) (on file with authors).
125. Ayres and Talley, supra note 9, at 1065-72, stressed this point.
126. See Rose, supra note 9, at 2190-91.
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Alternative Informational Assumptions

The foregoing analysis made imperfect information assumptions
that are standard in the law and economics literature - namely, we
assumed that the probability distributions of the litigants are (after
trial) common knowledge, but only litigants know their own true
valuations.127 Here, we consider three variations on these assumptions:
(a) the litigants are imperfectly informed about their own true valua
tions; (b) the litigants' probability functions are not common knowl
edge; and (c) courts systematically misestimate the probability distri
butions of the litigants' values.
The possibility that litigants do not precisely know their own valua
tions does not seriously limit our analysis. Although litigants may not
know with precision the prospective value of owning an entitlement,
the litigants nonetheless might estimate a certain cash-equivalent
amount that would leave them indifferent as between the entitlement
or this cash amount. Just as individuals often buy and sell entitlements
for discrete cash amounts despite their uncertainty about the future
value of ownership, litigants may be able to estimate their own values.
As long as the individual litigants are better informed than the
court, liability rules - by privatizing the ultimate allocative authority
- can enhance ex post efficiency. In mathematical terms, as long as
litigants' beliefs about their valuation probability functions have less
volatility than the court's beliefs about the litigants' valuations, the
litigants will have an informational advantage over the court in ulti
mately allocating the entitlement. 128
Even if litigants know their own valuations, one might worry that
they cannot, contrary to our model's assumption, assess even the
probability distribution of the other party. Nonetheless, we believe
that this should also not pose a large concern. Liability rules do not
require a chooser to assess directly the probability functions of an ad
versary; rather, a chooser need only confront the court-determined
damage amount, or what we have called the allocative price. Court
appointed choosers do not need to estimate nonchooser valuations as
long as the court itself, after discovery and trial, can estimate a valua
tion distribution sufficiently to determine optimal single- or dual
chooser damages.129 As stressed above, single-chooser allocations will
127. See, e.g. , Kalyan Chatterjee & William Samuelson, Bargaining Under Incomplete
Information, 31 OPERATIONS RES. 835 (1983); Peter C. Cramton, Strategic Delay in Bargain
ing with Two-Sided Uncertainty, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 205 (1992).
128. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
129. In some contexts, especially with regard to dual-chooser regimes, a potential liti
gant makes the first-stage choice before the court has determined damages. For example, a
potential defendant may decide to encroach in anticipation of the plaintiff having the put
like choice of injunction or damages for permanent encroachment. In such circumstances, a
rational encroacher would want to assess what damages the court will likely set.
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also tend to simplify the court's decisionmaking by requiring the court
to estimate only the mean of the litigant with the less speculative
valuation. Of course, the less speculative valuation may still, from the
court's perspective, remain quite speculative, but courts only need to
make an unbiased estimate in order to harness the litigant's private in
formation in allocating the entitlement.
A more serious informational concern involves court estimates of
litigants' valuation distributions that for some reason become system
atically biased. For example, if courts in implementing single-chooser
allocations systematically underestimated (overestimated) the non
chooser means, then they would set damages too low (high) and would
induce the chooser to inefficiently allocate the entitlement too often
(rarely) to itself. If higher branches of government (appellate courts or
the legislature) realize that lower branches (trial courts/juries) system
atically underestimate the mean value of residents, a standard re
sponse is that the higher branch might force the lower branch to es
chew liability rules altogether and instead give the residents the
pollution entitlement protected by a property rule. If the mean valua
tion assessments of the more authoritative branches of government
are also biased, the allocation problem becomes truly intractable. We
readily admit that our model will not perform well, but neither will
most other allocative regimes.
C.

Unintentional Taking

Our option model has been quintessentially about intentional tak
ings. One or both litigants choose whether to exercise intentionally a
particular option. In many contexts, this assumption is reasonable. Po
tential defendants at times make deliberate decisions to impair plain
tiffs' entitlements. The plaintiffs' election of remedies to seek an in
junction or monetary damages also almost always fits the deliberate
model.
Many, if not most, torts, however, concern unintentional takings.
We therefore must ask whether our models have anything to say to
this large class of takings. We believe they do. First, unintentional tak
ings actually increase the ability of courts to apply single-chooser allo
cations, especially plaintiff-choice allocations. If Calabresi inadver
tently and nonstrategically encroaches on Melamed's land, courts have
even greater freedom to apply a true plaintiff-choice allocation and
give Melamed unilateral allocative authority based on a single alloca
tive price. With regard to deliberate encroachments, by contrast,
courts may not be able to apply a pure plaintiff-choice allocation, be
cause potential encroachers may take into account the second-stage
plaintiff choice when deciding whether or not in the first stage to en
croach.
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Second, and more speculatively, an options model of deliberate
taking may have something to tell us about negligence regimes. Even
when potential defendants do not deliberately take plaintiffs' entitle
ments, the defendants often do make deliberate choices as to the care
level they will use to avoid taking. In some contexts we can think
about choice of care level as tantamount to choosing the probability
that an accident will occur. Put more in the argot of finance, level of
care choices represent the potential defendants' choice of probability
that they will exercise their takings options. Damages that equal the
nonchooser's mean valuation - that is, the plaintiff's mean valuation
of impairment - will induce takings only when the probabilistic value
of takings, as measured in saved due care costs, exceeds the plaintiff's
average loss. Thus, we can restate the Learned Hand formula in op
tion terms, but we often do not gain much from the translation. Many
torts do not fit a plaintiff-choice allocation because once the defen
dants destroy the entitlements, a court cannot ask the plaintiffs
whether they would prefer the entitlements themselves (for example,
an arm) instead of cash.
Even with regard to negligent taking, however, some circum
stances may permit a second-stage plaintiff election of remedy, and
the foregoing analysis may apply. If Epstein negligently takes
Calabresi's galoshes at the theater, common law courts can give, and
traditionally have given, Calabresi the option to take back the shoes or
to receive money.130 In setting the damage amount, the court may cre
ate a kind of dual-chooser allocation that would impact both the due
care with which Epstein examines galoshes at the theater and
Calabresi's decision whether to seek injunctive or damage relief.
D. Numerosity
Our previous discussion has relentlessly focused on bilateral dis
putes. We have assumed that a dispute concerns only one plaintiff and
one defendant; and we have also assumed that there are no third par
ties who might contend for being the highest valuer of the entitlement.
Both of these assumptions characterize a nontrivial amount of real
world litigation. For example, in Copart Industries v. Consolidated
Edison, a particular type of pollution from a ConEd plant disrupted
the ability of a single plaintiff to continue its new car preparation
business.131 Many nuisance disputes, however, will involve multiple
litigants on one or both sides of the litigation. For example, the ten
dency of pollution to spread means that a single defendant's effluence

130. See Ayres, supra note 9, at 794.
131. 362 N.E.2d 968 (N.Y. 1977); see also cases cited supra note 27.
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may affect multiple plaintiffs.132 Krier and Schwab have seized on this
difference in numerosity to argue that defendants will tend to make
more efficient choosers because they are less numerous.133 As applied
to our analysis, Krier and Schwab would argue that defendant-choice
rules, including the Rule 2 call-option implementation and the Rule 5
put-option implementation, would tend to dominate plaintiff-choice
rules. We agree that the additional collective action difficulties of a
diffuse plaintiff class will, all else being equal, tend to militate toward
the use of defendant-choice allocations. Furthermore, our decoupling
result improves upon Krier and Schwab's theory by showing that a
continuum of defendant-choice allocations can take equivalent advan
tage of the defendant's private information while providing even more
nuanced distributive possibilities.
Nevertheless, we disagree with Krier and Schwab's seemingly ex
clusive focus on numerosity as the determinant of the more efficient
chooser. Instead, we believe that selection of the more efficient
chooser will also tum importantly on which party has a greater infor
mational advantage relative to the court. All else equal, the party the
court believes has the more volatile valuation will be the more effi
cient chooser.
In many nuisance disputes numerosity and volatility will push the
court in different directions. The plaintiffs in nuisance disputes often
include more members than the defendants, but these plaintiffs are
also likely to have more speculative valuations. Often, courts may
more easily measure the economic costs of abating or discontinuing
pollution than assess the noneconomic damages of pollution on sur
rounding Residents. Even though multiple Residents will often have
high collective decisionmaking costs, they will also often possess more
relevant private information in that they will know how much pollu
tion really harms them.134
At times, courts should give the choice to multiple Residents and
accept the resultant collective-action problems, rather than give the
Polluter the choice and disregard the Residents' private information.
For example, we believe that the residents in Boomer v. Atlantic Ce
ment1 35 might have made better choices than the polluter, notwith
standing their relative numerosity. Relative to the court, these resi
dents would have had much more information about their own
valuations of the entitlement. While we concede that numerosity will
132. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2342-44 (1996).
133. Krier & Schwab, supra note 7, at 471-72.
134. In addition, Residents often will have higher levels of risk aversion than the Pol
luter, who may in turn have greater opportunities to diversify loss, and hence, Residents will,
other things being equal, tend to make better choosers.
135. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
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often militate against giving the choice to multiple residents, the vari
ance effect will often militate in favor of precisely this brand of alloca
tive choice.
Our two-player models also limit the applicability of our analysis
with regard to the exclusion of potential third-party claimants for ul
timate ownership of the entitlement in question. In a world in which
three or more different parties are the potentially most efficient ulti
mate owner of the entitlement, courts will have more difficulty imple
menting a liability rule regime. Absent bargaining, however, property
rules will also perform badly in allocating the entitlement to the most
efficient owner, unless the imperfectly informed court by chance hap
pens to allocate the entitlement to its highest valuer. When the liti
gants can feasibly bargain, the multiplicity of potential highest valuers
favors a property rule. Liability rules, by contrast, can increase the
cost of contracting (a) by failing to allocate claims to its potentially
highest valuers, or (b) by allocating claims to people who do not value
it highly. For example, when a court gives a partial entitlement to inef
ficient owners, they will only turn around and try to sell it, and their
usual incentives to seek inflated prices can impede negotiations with
the class of potentially highest valuers. Thus, low valuers who mistak
enly receive a claim on the entitlement can inefficiently hold up the
transaction. 1 36 This is also another example of what Heller called the
anticommons problem: too many people can block the transfer of an
entitlement to its highest valuing owner.137 As the pool of potentially
high valuers increases, liability rules of both the single-chooser and
dual-chooser varieties can exacerbate this holdout or anticommons
problem.
E.

Cognitive Bias and Wealth Effects

A central finding of the previous analysis concerns the allocative
invariance of all implementations within a particular fundamental al
locative class. For example, we have shown that any defendant-choice
rule with a particular allocative price (DLJ) will produce identical allo
cations for any possible sets of private plaintiff and defendant valua
tions. This invariance result only holds true, however, in the absence
of wealth and cognitive framing effects.
As with the Coase theorem's invariance prediction,138 our alloca
tive invariance finding will not hold true if the chooser's willingness to

136. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 1086.
137. Heller, supra note 100.
138. See John J. Donohue, III, Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive Schemes to Reduce
Unemployment Spells, 99 YALE L.J. 549, 550 (1989); Stewart Schwab, A Coasean Experiment
on Contract Presumptions, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 242-43 (1988).
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pay is affected by its overall wealth.139 Defendant-choice rules that al
locate larger expected payoffs to the defendant might make the de
fendant more or less willing to pay a particular allocative price in allo
cating the entitlement to itself.
More generally, the extent to which choosers' willingness to pay a
given price differs from their willingness to accept that same price
qualifies the allocative invariance result. For both cognitive- and
wealth-effect reasons, particular choosers will often demand higher
prices when selling an entitlement than they would willingly pay to
buy it.140 As Saul Levmore has noted in discussing put options:
Armed with the legal right to be free of pollution, [a Resident] might
have demanded $1,000,000, for example before allowing [a Polluter] to
send effluents her way, so that [the Resident's] damages from [the Pol
luter's] operation can fairly be said to amount to $1,000,000; but this does
not mean that [the Resident] could or would pay this amount to stop [the
Polluter], if the law requires [the Resident] to pay in order to [stop pollu
tion].141

This suggests that a range of prices exists (in Levmore's example,
between $700,000 and $1,000,000) in which the plaintiff-residents
would allocate the entitlement to themselves under a put-option im
plementation (Rule 6) but would allocate the entitlement to the de
fendant under a call-option implementation (Rule 4). For these inter
mediate damage amounts, the law's selection of an initial entitlement
holder not surprisingly will tend to be sticky. This should not be sur
prising. Scholars have long known that endowment effects impede
trade and bargaining in the shadow of property rules; this result car
ries over to option regimes as well.
More controversial, however, is whether lawmakers should privi
lege endowment effects in a cost-benefit calculus. If Residents value
an entitlement more than a Polluter merely because the court initially
endows them with it, lawmakers might want to set a low call-option
price to allow the Polluter to take control of the entitlement and bene
fit from its own endowment effect. One goal, which courts must trade
off against other equity goals, focuses on production of a legal regime
where the entitlement flowed to the person who has the highest will-

139. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-10,
119-27 (2nd ed. 1989); Stewart J. Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and
Economists Do Not, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1 171, 1 178-83 (1989) (book review).
140. Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory and Ideology in the Coase
Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 673 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401 (1981); Russell Korobkin, Note,
Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory of Efficient Entitlement Al
location, 46 STAN. L. REV. 663 (1994).
141. Levmore, supra note 9, at 2166.
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ingness to accept.142 From an efficiency standpoint, this goal would
rank people by their value of "having" rather than their value of "not
having." Other things being equal, this standard would lead toward
giving the initial entitlement to the party with the larger endowment
effect.
The proliferation of different single-chooser rules, including the
call, put, pay-or-be-paid, and pay-or-pay implementations, again, can
help lawmakers accommodate competing concerns. When cognitive or
wealth effects cause these implementations to differ allocatively, this
proliferation will at least permit policymakers more flexibility in bal
ancing a variety of efficiency and equity concerns. Efficiency might
demand that the initial entitlement go to the party with the larger en
dowment effect. But if this is the party that the court believes also is
the more efficient chooser, then the court can accommodate both of
these efficiency concerns by giving the party both the initial entitle
ment and a put option.
But more work needs to be done to see the extent to which an en
dowment effect persists under the various implementations of single
and dual-chooser allocations. The path-breaking mug experiments of
Kahneman, Knetsh, and Thaler only tested whether entitlements pro
tected by property rules gave rise to endowment effects.143 It is much
less clear whether endowments protected by liability rules, that is, sub
ject to someone else's call option, give rise to the same effect. In the
shadow of a call option, the initial entitlement holder has a more tran
sient, less secure claim to the entitlement and thus might not establish
the cognitive bond that gives rise to the effect. In fact, Jeff
Rachlinski and Forest Jourden have recently conducted experiments
showing that traditional liability (call-option) rules largely extinguish
the endowment effect.144 But put options or other intermediate im
plementations, such as the pay-or-be-paid rule may produce different
142. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL
225, 232-34, 245-47 (1991) (claiming that willingness to accept should always be used
rather than willingness to pay). Russell Korobkin, however, has suggested reasons why allo
cation of entitlements on the basis of willingness to accept is inappropriate when independ
ent social norms oppose sales of certain types of entitlements:
STUD.

Narrowly stated, our society teaches us that we should not sell some things, although buying
them is socially acceptable. Although an individual might, in a cultural vacuum, prefer a spe
cific quantity of money to a certain entitlement, he might feel that selling the entitlement is
improper and therefore, his WTA will exceed his WTP. This explanation has been called the
"dignity hypothesis."

Korobkin, supra note 140, at 691-92.
143. Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests ofthe Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990).
144. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Owner
ship, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1545 (1998) (arguing that "the endowment effect might de
pend on whether the law protects an interest with a property rule or a liability rule"). This
possibility was first suggested in Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 1 102.
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endowment effects. For example, put-option rules may heighten the
endowment effect because put-option implementations give the initial
entitlement holder even more control over the "endowment" than
traditional property rules, and thus may enhance the solidity of owner
ship.145 If we view the endowment effect as a source of real value that
we want to nurture, as opposed to a "status quo bias" or "framing ef
fect" that we want to overcome,146 then put options may overcome the
inefficiencies of the holdout problem without destroying the "value of
having." More generally, however, the infinity of single-chooser rules
discovered here gives policymakers more flexibility in testing for and
managing the pros and cons of cognitive bias.
F.

Correlated Valuations

Our analysis thus far has assumed that the litigants have independ
ently distributed valuations. While we can plausibly assume this in
some contexts,147 Kaplow and Shaven have pointed out that a plain
tiff's and defendant's valuation of physical objects may correlate.148 If
a plaintiff places a high value on an oilfield or laptop computer, there
are good reasons to think that a defendant's value may also be high.
Correlated valuatioris make it more difficult for courts to use liabil
ity rules to harness the parties' private information. For example, Kap
low and Shaven have shown that if we can decompose the litigants'
overall
valuations
into
a
"common-value"
and
an
"idiosyncratic-value" component,149 courts will have difficulty in set
ting a damage amount that induces takings so as to increase social wel
fare. For example, suppose that (i) the litigants have a uniformly dis
tributed common-value component between $0 and $100; (ii) the
plaintiff has a uniformly and independently distributed idiosyncratic
value component between $0 and $100; and, (iii) the defendant has a
145. Russell Korobkin, however, has suggested to us that the put option may commodify
the entitlement in the owner's mind in ways that reduce the endowment effect. Imagine that
after a pure-bred dog has puppies, a mother tells her daughter she can keep the puppies or,
after they are weaned, can sell them for $50 to a neighbor who has made a firm offer. The
daughter's knowledge that she has a put option might stop her from bonding as closely with
the puppies during the weaning period as she would have otherwise and hence mitigate the
endowment effect.
146. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias .and Contract Default Rules, 83
REV. 608 (1998).

CORNELL L.

147. For example, in many nuisance contexts it is plausible to assume that a Polluter's
value from polluting will be independent of a Resident's value of nonpollution.
148. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15, at 759.
149. Id. at 759-60 ("First, suppose that things have a significant common value, that is, a
component of value that is the same for both the owner and any taker . . . . Second, assume
that things also have idiosyncratic value to individuals. Idiosyncratic value derives from
characteristics of a thing that different individuals evaluate differently, such as the design of
a home.").
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uniformly and independently distributed idiosyncratic-value compo
nent between $0 and $75. A traditional liability rule, Rule 2, with
damages set equal to the plaintiff's mean valuation of $100 (a $50
mean common value plus a $50 mean idiosyncratic value) will operate
less efficiently than a property rule, Rule 1, which simply gave the
plaintiff the entitlement.
When the litigants have positively correlated valuations, the court
will have difficulty setting an allocative price to distinguish between
unexpectedly high realizations of the common-value component ver
sus unexpectedly high realizations of the idiosyncratic-value compo
nent. A Rule 2 with $100 damages would induce the defendant in this
example to take too often. For example, when the common-value
component turned out to equal $80, a defendant would take if the de
fendant's idiosyncratic value fell as low as $20, even though such tak
ings would inefficiently allocate the entitlement because the defen
dant's mean idiosyncratic value equals $50. 1 50
Restated in the terms of this Article, Kaplow and Shavell's sugges
tion means that when the litigants have substantially correlated valua
tions, the optimal delegation is no delegation: courts should allocate
the entitlement via a property rule rather than delegate the allocative
decision to the litigants via a liability rule.
Although Kaplow and Shavell are correct that correlated valua
tions make it more difficult to harness private valuations, they wrongly
conclude that property rules work better than liability rules when liti
gants have positively correlated values. In a separate essay, we show
that the examples in Kaplow and Shavell's original article systemati
cally overstate the advantages of property rules by comparing the
more efficient property rule to a liability rule that has nonoptimal
damages and the less efficient chooser. 151 But for now, it is sufficient to
see how nicely dual-chooser rules can respond to the correlated value
problem.
Remember that as a traditional liability rule, Rule 2 has the prob
lem that defendants may take not because they have high idiosyncratic
values but merely because both litigants have unexpectedly high real
ized common-values. The court would like defendants to take only if
their idiosyncratic values are unexpectedly high, but the court cannot
observe either their common- or idiosyncratic-value components. It
can only set a single damage figure that might induce defendants to
take either because they have unexpectedly high idiosyncratic values
(creating efficient takings), or because both they and the plaintiffs
have an unexpectedly high common value (creating inefficient tak-

150. Id. , at 760.
151. See Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, A Critique of "Tangibility" as the Basis for
Property Rules (2001 ) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
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ings). Although the court cannot observe whether defendants take be
cause of a high common value or a high idiosyncratic value, the plain
tiff can.
Dual-chooser rules respond well to the problem of correlated
valuations because these rules allow the other side to veto takings
driven by common-value realizations. The problem with Rule 2 in the
foregoing example was that defendants might take merely because the
common-value component was unexpectedly high. A plaintiff
presumption allocation, however, eliminates this problem by allowing
the plaintiff to veto takings that are driven by both parties having a
high common value. Under a plaintiff-presumption allocation, the en
titlement will ultimately go to the defendant only if the plaintiff's total
value, common plus idiosyncratic, is less than the damage amount and
only if the defendant's total value is greater than the damage amount.
Indeed, in the foregoing example we can show that the optimal dual
chooser rule produces systematically higher expected joint payoffs
than the optimal property rule.1 52 Thus, while correlated valuations
make optimal delegation a more difficult judicial task, one or two pri
vate heads can still be better than none.
G. Bargaining
Probably the most serious qualification to our analysis thus far
concerns our assumption of autarky. Our formal model assumes that
the litigants cannot bargain with each other and considers instead the
equilibrium allocation and distribution absent negotiations. This as
sumption can be given two partial defenses, but ultimately much more
work needs to be done to understand how liability rules should be
structured in a world where transaction costs are relatively small. In
this Section, we sketch these two partial defenses for our autarky as
sumption and then show how dual-chooser allocations induce a new
type of information forcing that may favor their use when transaction
costs are relatively low.
The first partial defense of an autarky assumption is empirical. In
at least some bilateral contexts, the disputants seem extremely reluc
tant even to negotiate, much less agree to contract. Ward Farnsworth,
for example, surveyed nuisance disputants after an initial trial decision
and found almost without exception that the litigants and their attor
neys failed even to consider negotiation in the shadow of the law.1 53
Enmity between the litigants may produce an important barrier to
trade and thus inhibit private contract as a means of allocation.

152. In the foregoing example, Rule 1 produces· an expected payoff of $100, while the
optimal plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser rule produces an expected payoff of $101 .39.
153. Farnsworth, supra note 29.
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Second, an understanding of how liability rules perform when liti
gants cannot feasibly trade may provide valuable insights into the rela
tive efficiency of these rules when the litigants can bargain. The autar
kic payoffs that we have analyzed above become the threat points that
will deeply influence the litigants' bargaining strategies. Negotiation
theorists at times refer to such autarkic payoffs as representing the in
dividual litigants' "reservation prices" for trade, or their "BATNAs"
("best alternative to negotiated agreement").1 54 Because litigants can
not be forced through consensual trade to accept less than their
BATNA, our previous analysis of how judges might vary the distribu
tion of payoffs will continue to hold true in a world where bargaining
feasibly can occur. For example, adopting a defendant-choice alloca
tion with a relatively high alpha value (a pay-or-be-paid rule) enables
the court, even when bargaining can occur, to assure the plaintiff a
higher expected return and the defendant a lower expected return
than a defendant-choice rule with a put option (Rule 5).
Kaplow and Shavell, however, have gone further to argue that le
gal regimes that are relatively more efficient in allocating the entitle
ment when bargaining is not possible are likely to continue to be more
efficient as transaction costs subside and bargaining becomes feasible.
Of course, the Coase theorem teaches that all contractable legal re
gimes, such as property, single-chooser, and dual-chooser rules, will
allocate entitlements equally efficiently when transaction costs are nil.
Nevertheless, Kaplow and Shaven have argued that the relative effi
ciency of different rules when bargaining cannot take place will tend
to persist when bargaining becomes possible, but not perfectly. 155 Un
der this persistence conjecture, the nonconsensual advantage that, say,
a defendant-choice allocation might have (when the litigants' mean
valuations are similar and the variance of the defendant's valuation is
greater than the plaintiff's) relative to the other three single-price
allocations would be likely to persist if the parties could bargain. For
Kaplow and Shavell, this nonconsensual headstart that a particular
rule has over others in promoting allocative efficiency will on average
persist as transaction costs recede and trade becomes possible.
If the persistence conjecture is true, then the foregoing analysis
would end the story. By knowing how best to tailor rules when bar
gaining was prohibited, judges would perforce know how best to tailor
rules when bargaining was allowed. Unfortunately, we are not con
vinced that the persistence conjecture tells the entire story. While it is
surely the case that the most efficient liability rule under autarky has a
headstart when bargaining is permitted, it is at least possible that other,

154. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Jan Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80
VA. L. REV. 323, 331 & nn.26 & 27 (1994).
155. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15, passim.
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consensual attributes of the rules may come to dominate the noncon
sensual attributes. We know, for example, that the persistence conjec
ture at most describes only a tendency, because Ayres and
Talley have provided a numerical counterexample in which a noncon
sensual advantage of property rules over liability rules did not persist
once bargaining became possible. 156 Moreover, these authors have
demonstrated that liability rules have a much stronger "information
forcing" effect than property rules do. This information-forcing effect
represents a potential "consensual advantage" of liability rules that
may be more important in the relative efficiency of different legal re
gimes when bargaining costs are lower than the nonconsensual advan
tage that Kaplow and Shaven have emphasized.
In terms of the foregoing analysis, single-chooser allocations give
nonchoosers a robust incentive to reveal through bargaining whether
their value is above or below their mean valuation. For example, imag
ine that a court establishes a defendant-choice call-option rule in
which defendants can self-allocate the entitlement when they make a
payment to plaintiffs of one million dollars, the plaintiffs' estimated
mean valuation. The plaintiffs can respond by trying either (a) to sell
the entitlement for less than one million dollars, or (b) to buy the de
fendants' call option (in essence trying to bribe the defendants not to
take nonconsensually) . The plaintiffs as nonchoosers will offer to pay
the defendants not to take only if the plaintiffs have an actual valua
tion higher than the court's estimate of their mean valuation, and they
will offer to sell the underlying entitlement only if they have an actual
valuation lower than the court's estimate. By merely expressing an in
terest in one type of trade or another, nonchoosers can thus credibly
signal whether their actual valuation is higher or lower than the court's
estimate of their mean valuation.157 Analogously, plaintiff-choice allo
cations give the defendants as nonchoosers a robust incentive to signal
credibly how their actual valuation compares to their mean valuation,
again, merely by which type of trade they offer to transact.
If the parties' imperfect information poses the primary barrier to
trade, it is at least possible that these information-forcing effects will
dominate the nonconsensual advantages of the different liability rules
outlined above. In particular, the more efficient choosers in the ab
sence of bargaining will clearly tend to be the litigants with the more
speculative valuation. When bargaining can occur, however, the more
efficient choosers might be the litigants with the less speculative valua156. Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 1 104.
157. Under a put implementation of a defendant-choice rule, the plaintiffs would offer
to pay the defendants not to exercise their put only when the plaintiffs have an actual valua
tion lower than the court's estimate of their mean valuation, and the plaintiffs would offer to
pay the defendants for the underlying entitlement only when the plaintiffs have an actual
valuation higher than the court's estimate of it.
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tion, for negotiations will quickly allow high variance litigants to nar
row their observable distributions by credibly signaling whether they
have a relatively high or low valuation. To date, however, we have not
succeeded in modeling an example in which, when bargaining can oc
cur, the litigant with the less speculative valuation became the more
efficient chooser. But, at a minimum, the information-forcing effect on
the nonchooser systematically narrows the allocative efficiency differ
ential between the two single-choice allocations.
The question of whether our autarkic results persist in the pres
ence of bargaining becomes all the more interesting when we add to
the mix the possibility of dual-chooser allocations. Dual-chooser allo
cations turn out to have an arguably even stronger information-forcing
effect than single-chooser allocations. While single-chooser allocations
give one of the litigants, the nonchoosers, an incentive to signal
whether they have a relatively high or low valuation, dual-chooser al
locations give both litigants an opportunity to signal credibly whether
they have a high or a low valuation by merely expressing an interest in
a particular type of trade.
Consider, for example, a plaintiff-presumption allocation imple
mented through a call-call option regime in which the plaintiff receives
(a) the initial entitlement, (b) subject to the defendant's call option
(with an exercise price of D17P), but (c) also a call option (with an exer
cise price of Dnp) to take back the entitlement. In the absence of bar
gaining, the plaintiff-presumption allocation gives rise to two different
types of inefficiencies. The first type occurs when the defendant has
the higher valuation but the plaintiff nonetheless vetoes a defendant
allocation by exercising its take-back option. This occurs when
vL1 > vn > DnP· And the Coasean solution would be for the defendant to
buy the plaintiff's take-back (call) option. The second type of ineffi
ciency occurs when the defendant has the higher valuation but the de
fendant nonetheless vetoes a defendant-allocation by failing to exer
cise its initial call option. This occurs when Dnp > vL1 > vn. And the
Coasean solution for this inefficiency would be for the defendant to
buy the underlying entitlement (for some price less than D17p).
When negotiating in the shadow of this legal rule, the defendants
can credibly signal their relatively high valuation ( vL1 > D17P) by merely
expressing an interest in paying the plaintiff not to exercise its take
back option. 1 58 Conversely, the plaintiff could credibly signal that it has
a relatively low value (v17 < DrtP) by merely expressing an interest in
selling its entitlement for a price less than Dnp. Low-value defendants
would never have a strategic reason for expressing an interest in buy
ing - much less actually offering to buy - the plaintiff's take-back
158. The defendant could also credibly signal its high value by exercising its first-stage
call option. But the information-forcing stressed in the text allows the defendant to signal its
high valuation even before it is called upon to exercise its first-stage option.
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option. And high-value plaintiffs would never have a strategic reason
for expressing an interest in selling - much less actually offering to
sell - their entitlement for a price less than Dnfa. Thus dual-chooser
allocations create some opportunity for both litigants to credibly
communicate their relative valuations through the process of negotia
tion.
Just as correlated litigant valuations in the discussion above ex
panded the set of circumstances in which dual-chooser allocations
yielded greater allocative efficiency, the arguably stronger informa
tion-forcing properties of dual-chooser allocations may further mili
tate for their use as trade in the shadow of these rules becomes more
feasible. A full analysis of liability rules under conditions of low but
nonzero transaction costs has eluded scholars. The particular ranking
of the rules' relative efficiency might turn not just on the general char
acteristics of the litigants' valuation distributions but also on the spe
cifics of the bargaining procedures that are assumed.
In this Section, we have tried to argue that autarkic results are of
interest because (a) some bilateral disputants face high transaction
costs; (b) the nonconsensual headstart that we have identified may
tend to persist when bargaining is possible; and (c) the autarkic pay
offs that we have derived become the threat points that will signifi
cantly inform the bargaining behavior of the parties. Our finding that
dual-chooser allocations create different and arguably stronger infor
mation-forcing effects than those previously identified for single
chooser allocations suggests, however, that the autarkic analysis may
not tell the complete story. On this dimension we are forced to repeat
the hackneyed and unsatisfactory conclusion that more research on
this issue is warranted.
CONCLUSION
While we have often motivated our analysis with a nuisance exam
ple, this Article is really about a deeper and more canonical problem
about how courts should allocate rivalrous entitlements when the
court has poorer information than the litigants about who is the higher
valuing owner. Most basically, we have considered a conflict in which
the court - even after discovery and an adversarial trial - has only a
probabilistic assessment of each litigant's value, whereas each litigant
knows (or at least has better information) about how much it values
the entitlement. In such a basic bilateral dispute with imperfect judi
cial information, the court faces a nontrivial problem of how best to
allocate claims to the entitlement.
When the private litigants are better informed than the court, the
court can usefully adopt an allocative rule that harnesses some of the
litigants' private information. This Article has shown that courts may
choose from four basic allocations. The traditional liability rules -
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Rules 2 and 4 - exemplify two of these basic allocations: the plaintiff
choice and defendant-choice allocations. But we have shown that
there are two other allocations - dual-chooser allocations - which
not only have common-law analogs but which, under specific circum
stances, can produce greater allocative efficiency than single-chooser
allocations.
Moreover, we have shown there are an infinite number of imple
mentations of each type of rule which are allocatively equivalent but
which allow the court to distribute the total expected payoff of the liti
gants as it sees fit. This means that courts, in resolving bilateral dis
putes, can decouple allocative and distributive concerns. By selecting
the more efficient chooser or choosers and by setting the efficient allo
cative price, a court can maximize ex post allocative efficiency. More
over, independent of these core allocative decisions, the court has a
free hand to distribute the expected payoffs as it wants. Thus, distribu
tively concerned courts are free to pursue equity or promote ex ante
efficiency without sacrificing their natural desire to see that the enti
tlement ends up in the hands of the highest valuing user (the ex post
allocative efficiency concern). This decoupling result and our analysis
of dual-chooser allocations are our central findings.
While we have focused on how courts should structure liability
rules, our analysis does have implications for the equally important
choice of when courts should opt for liability rules over property rules.
Legal scholars have generated a number of rationales for why prop
erty rules might dominate liability rules/59 We focus here on three ra
tionales for property rules that the foregoing analysis qualifies. One of
the oldest rationales states that property rules induce trade better than
liability rules when transaction costs remain relatively low. Ayres and
Talley seriously undermined this rationale by showing that liability
rules have a greater information-forcing effect than property rules and
by providing examples in which liability rules were more effective in
inducing trade. And this Article has extended this criticism by showing
that dual-chooser rules also have new and potentially stronger infor
mation-forcing qualities that may also give dual-chooser rules a con
sensual advantage over property rules.
As a second rationale, many authors, including Ayres and Talley,160
have argued that property rules give individuals better ex ante invest
ment incentives to create the disputed entitlement to begin with. The
idea here is that Krier will be less likely to build a new house if
Schwab has the option to take nonconsensually and pay Krier's mean
valuation. This result makes sense, however, only if we limit our atten-

159.
160.

See Ayres & Talley, supra note 9; Epstein, supra note 9; Rose, supra note 9.
Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 1743.
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tion to the call implementations of liability rules.161 The aforemen
tioned decoupling result shows that both single-chooser and dual
chooser implementations can yield even greater expected payoffs for
either litigant than a property rule regime can yield in the absence of
bargaining. The decoupling result seriously qualifies the investment
rationale for using property rules because it suggests that courts can
retain the ex post information-harnessing benefits of liability rules
without undermining ex ante investment incentives.
Finally, and most recently, Kaplow and Shavell have argued that
property rules will tend to work better than liability rules when the
litigants have correlated valuations. They have asserted that liability
rules will tend to be less efficient because choosers will allocate the en
titlement to themselves not because they have high idiosyncratic
valuations but because the common-value element of their valuations
takes on an unexpectedly high value and exceeds the court's allocative
price.162 Their analysis makes eminent sense in comparing the effi
ciency of property rules to single-chooser rules, 163 but as we have dem
onstrated above, they did not consider the possibility of dual-choice
rules, thereby limiting their analysis. Dual-chooser rules give both liti
gants a veto over certain allocations and can therefore better select for
circumstances when the idiosyncratic and not the common valuation is
driving the allocative choice.
In sum, the option analysis of liability rules as a theoretical matter
tends to tilt increasingly toward the use of liability rules. In some sense
this occurs as a natural byproduct of entering more liability-rule
horses into the race to compete against the two property-rule stalwarts
(Rules 1 and 3). Still, there are strong reasons why property rules will
at times dominate,164 but this Article and other recent efforts have
made progress in identifying narrower but firmer grounds on which
property rules can stake their superiority. When liability rules domi
nate, however, lawmakers would be well advised to consider the fuller
161. Even under the call implementation, it is not clear why this argument makes sense.
If Krier at the time of investment does not yet know his true valuation, then promising him
his mean valuation should not deter his investment. Indeed, if he is risk averse it may de
crease the variance in his payoffs and make him more willing to invest. If, however, Krier at
the time of investing knows his future valuation, then promising him his mean valuation,
should Schwab take the entitlement, may deter him from some valuable types of investment
when his actual value turns out to be higher than the court's perception of his mean valua
tion.
162. Conversely, choosers may allocate the entitlement to the nonchoosers, not because
they have low idiosyncratic valuations but because their common-value element takes on an
unexpectedly low value that falls short of the court's allocative price.
163. Although, as we note above, supra text accompanying note 151, Kaplow and
Shavell fail to compare the property rule to the most efficient single-chooser rule because
their example uses the less efficient chooser and nonoptimal damages.
164. Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 214;
9, at 2180.

note

Epstein, supra note
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panoply of liability-rule implementations than merely the call-option
rules of Calabresi and Melamed.
To get a fuller sense of why other implementations of the four ba
sic allocations might be useful, it is useful in closing to speculate on
how the foregoing analysis might be applied to breach of contract.1 65
Contractual entitlements are normally protected by a single type of li
ability rule. The promisor has a call option on the promisee's entitle
ment to performance. In other words, through breach, the promisor
can take the promisee's entitlement to performance and merely pay
compensatory damages set at the court's best estimate of the pro
misee's expected value of performance. Thus, unless the court feels
the situation warrants the extraordinary damage award of specific per
formance, the standard remedy implements a kind of Rule 2. Rechar
acterized in this way, we can see that contract law lags behind nuisance
law - because while at least one court (in Spur) 1 66 has applied
Calabresi and Melamed's Rule 4, contract courts do not typically allow
promisees to choose between specific performance or damages.
Accordingly, contract remedies inefficiently place allocative au
thority solely in the hands of the plaintiff promisor. True expectation
damages, as an implementation of a defendant-choice allocation, can
induce defendants to breach efficiently, given their private informa
tion about the costs of breach. But the foregoing analysis suggests that,
at times, the plaintiff will be better placed to decide whether perform
ance should take place, or at still other times both the plaintiff and the
defendant will make better allocative decisions (than either one or the
other could do by themselves). The traditional expectation damage
rule does a good j ob of harnessing the defendant-promisor's private
information but does not harness the private information of the plain
tiff-promisee. At times (particularly when the litigants have similar
variances but different means), the court would do better to establish
a dual-chooser allocation, announce an allocative price, and then give
each party the opportunity to veto the defendant's breach.
Or, as an alternative, courts could give the promisees an option to
increase the damages they would receive for the promisors' breach by
making a firm offer to pay more for performance.1 67 Thus, after a seller
repudiated a contract through anticipatory breach, a court might give
the buyer the option of offering the seller an additional amount to per165. To begin, the absence of contract law from Calabresi and Melamed's view of the
cathedral is striking. The subject might have been omitted because contracts didn't fit their
theory well. Calabresi and Melamed have been understood by subsequent scholars to have
argued that liability rules tend to dominate when transaction costs are high but that property
rules dominate when transaction costs are low. Contractual entitlements don't fit because
they are protected by liability rules even though transaction costs were sufficiently low for
the parties to enter into an initial contract.
166. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972).
167. Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 746.
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form. The seller could either accept this amount and perform, or
breach the contract and pay ordinary damages plus the additional
amount that the buyer offered to pay.168 Judges could effect this scheme
by instructing the jury to determine ordinary expectation damages
(without knowledge of the attempted modification) and then simply
adding this augmentation to the jury's award. This mechanism would
allow the plaintiff-buyers to signal credibly when their valuation of
performance exceeded the provable mean valuation.169 The defendant
sellers would then face a more authentic allocative price in deciding
whether to breach.
Both contract and nuisance law provide rich settings in which to
apply our analysis, but others exist as well. For example, many coun
tries use "compulsory licensing" schemes to mitigate the bilateral mo
nopoly problems of "blocking patents."17° Compulsory licenses, of
course, amount to a call-option implementation of a single-choice al
location. By now, however, grants of the allocative choice to the other
side or to both sides in a blocking patent dispute obviously might yield
superior results, and courts might then usefully consider pay-or-be
paid implementations to adjust the expected distribution. At the end
of the day, bilateral disputes over rivalrous entitlements do not come
close to describing the "cathedral" of allocative dilemmas facing
courts, but they represent a substantial enough proportion of the
world to justify our inquiry.

168. Courts should limit the buyer's ability to augment the seller's potential damages to
circumstances in which performance can feasibly occur. Otherwise, buyers might make an
inflated offer for performance (that is, an offer that exceeds their private valuation of per
formance) if they know that changed circumstances have rendered the seller's performance
impossible. See id. at 747 n.137.
169. B uyers deciding how much extra to offer for performance would have a powerful
incentive not to offer too much. If the offer grows too generous, the seller would simply ac
cept it and perform.
170. See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and
the Reality, 33 IDEA 349 (1987) (noting that blocking patents are one of the three most
common conditions for compulsory licensing abroad). Countries that have compulsory li
censes for blocking patents include Australia, China, France, Japan, the Netherlands, New
Zealand and Switzerland. See ROBERT MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
BARGAINING BREAKDOWN: THE CASE OF IMPROVEMENT INVENTIONS AND BLOCKING
PATENTS 30-31 (1994). U.S. patent law also mandates compulsory licenses with regard to
nuclear power and environmental engineering technologies. See Ayres & Talley, supra note
9, at 1093.

